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INNOVATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
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In 2006, Apple began shipping certain Mac computers without
informing customers that the computers were equipped with the latest
innovation in wireless technology, the 802.11 n wireless card. Later, Apple
revealed that these computers were enabled to use the wireless card, but
that customers would have to pay $1.99 to download software to activate
the technology. In response to customer demands for an explanation, an
Apple spokesperson explained that, due to accounting rules mandated by
federal corporate governance law, the company was required to charge a
nominal fee for the software because it had already recognized revenue on
the computers when they first began to ship.' This incident demonstrates
that there is a subtle yet powerful relationship between innovation and
corporate governance. This Article examines that relationship.
Analysis of the relationship between innovation and corporate
governance is timely, as scholars and policymakers continue to debate the
impact of the corporate governance changes brought about by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX").2 In response to several corporate
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1. Jacqui Cheng, Apple Confirms 802.1 In Fee, But for Less Than Expected, INFINITE
Loop, Jan. 18, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/journals/apple.ars/2007/1/18/6679; Tom Krazit,
Apple's 802.11n Accounting Conundrum, CNETNEWS.COM, Jan. 19, 2007,
http://www.news.corn/Apples-802.11 n-accounting-conundrum/2100-1044_3-6151790.html.
2. See, e.g., LUIGI ZINGALES ET AL., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL
MARKETS REGULATION 29-39, 131-34 *2006), available at
http://crapo.senate.gov/documents/committee-capmarkets-reg.pdf (finding that U.S. capital
markets have become less competitive post-SOX and recommending reforms to reduce the
costs of SOX's internal control provisions); Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 Really this Costly? A Discussion of Evidence from Event Returns and Going-Private
Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 146 (2007) (reviewing studies finding that SOX imposes
substantial costs on public companies and arguing that such costs may not be attributable to
SOX and therefore that the conclusions of the studies are premature); Kate Litvak,
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governance failures in 2001 and 2002, Congress enacted SOX to reduce
management's ability to abuse accounting rules or otherwise act
opportunistically at the expense of investors. SOX increases monitoring
over corporate executives, requires more extensive internal control over
financial reporting, and stiffens civil and criminal penalties for fraud and
other violations of the federal securities laws.3 This Article finds that, by
tilting corporate governance toward more objective monitoring by outsiders
and thereby restricting subjective decision making by insiders, SOX likely
reduces the innovative potential of a significant portion of public
companies, and this, in turn, may impose a cost on society in the form of
foregone benefits from innovation.
Previous evaluations of SOX have not addressed the law's impact on
innovation as undertaken by established public corporations. To the extent
that other studies have focused on SOX's impact on innovation, they
examined SOX's potential to undermine the growth of small,
entrepreneurial companies by raising the barriers to access public capital
markets.4 This is in part because corporate governance scholarship rarely
analyzes innovation.' By first examining the relationship between
innovation and corporate governance, this Article provides new insights
about the impact of SOX on innovation.6
Innovation is a process that results in new products, methods of
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1857, 1860-61 (2007)
(finding that in the year SOX was passed the relatively higher price of foreign company
shares that are subject to U.S. regulation through cross-listing decreased); Robert A.
Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxl as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is
the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007) (arguing that early criticisms of SOX are
misguided and that SOX may have provided benefits); N. K. Chidambaran et al., Does
Better Corporate Governance "Cause" Better Firm Performance? 6 (March 2007)
(unpublished research paper, on file with Rutgers Business School), available at
http://www.isb.edu/SummerResearchConference/Chidambaran.pdf (finding uniform
corporate governance reforms of the type mandated by SOX likely made investors in some
companies worse off).
3. See infra notes 136-152 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Lynn Stephens & Robert G. Schwartz, The Chilling Effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley: Myth or Reality?, CPA J., June 2006, at 14 (reporting on SOX's impact on 108
entrepreneurial technology companies).
5. See Marcela Miozzo & Paul Dewick, Building Competitive Advantage: Innovation
and Corporate Governance in European Construction, 31 RES. POL'Y 989, 990 (2002)
("Research on the relationship between corporate governance and the process of innovation
has been limited to date because the main theories of corporate governance do not integrate
systematically an analysis of the economics of innovation.").
6. As noted by a January 2008 advisory committee report to the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce, research on the relationship between SOX and innovation is lacking. THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MEASURING INNOVATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY,
INNOVATION MEASUREMENT: TRACKING THE STATE OF INNOVATION IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 12 (2008), available at http://www.innovationmetrics.gov/Innovation
%20Measurement%2001-08%20rev%20040908.pdf.
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production, and forms of business organization. Innovation can vastly
improve the welfare of consumers, investors, firms, and the economy.
Consumers are better off when innovation results in higher quality goods
and services or entirely new methods of production and distribution. In
2006 alone, a record 182,000 new consumer products were introduced
globally.' Investors also benefit when successful innovation increases the
price of their shares. Companies perform better when they successfully
innovate, contributing to the health of the economy and raising standards of
living.8 Yet, innovation is not without risk. Overspending on research and
development ("R&D"), for example, can destroy value to the detriment of
employees and investors. A short-term gain from innovation may be
squandered if it is mismanaged or quickly copied by rivals.9 Nonetheless,
given the widespread economic benefits derived from innovation, SOX's
impact on innovation by public companies is a cause for concern.
To understand the relationship between innovation and corporate
governance, Part I examines the defining characteristics of innovation as it
is undertaken by established corporations. Innovation is ultimately the
product of new knowledge and arises in response to economic change.
Corporate entrepreneurship activities, such as strategic renewal, which
enable companies to innovate the way they are organized, also facilitate
innovation. Innovation requires companies to commit to long-term risky
activities and coordinate the activities of employees throughout the
organization.
Based upon the characteristics of innovation and innovative firms,
Part II finds that governance structures, such as decentralization and an
emphasis on strategic internal control, facilitate innovation. The ultimate
purpose of such innovation-facilitating structures is to prevent managers
from focusing too much on relatively short-term and more readily-
quantifiable performance measures (myopia) and instead undertake the
long-term, risky, dynamic, and knowledge-intensive activities that result in
innovation. Innovation-facilitating structures and activities may, however,
also increase the ability of managers to benefit themselves at the expense of
7. Press Release, Mintel International Group, Record-Breaking Number of New
Products Flood Global CPG Shelves (Jan. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.mintel.com/press-release.php?id=254053.
8. See Bart Verspagen, Innovation and Economic Growth, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INNOVATION 487 (Jan Fagerberg et al. eds., 2005) (reviewing the literature on the
relationship between economic growth and innovation).
9. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA 111-256 (Collins
Business Essential 2005) (1997); see also William Lazonick, The Theory of the Innovative
Enterprise 3 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 200 1/15/SM), available at
http://ged.insead.edu/fichiersti/inseadwp2001/2001-15.pdf (finding that innovations may
place innovating firms at a cost disadvantage relative to rivals because "innovative strategies
tend to entail higher fixed costs than the fixed costs incurred by [non-innovating] rivals").
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the company. Value-maximizing companies must therefore successfully
negotiate the tradeoffs between reducing myopia and preventing
managerial opportunism.
Part III examines how the structures mandated by SOX impact this
tradeoff. SOX requires all public companies to increase objective
monitoring of managers by outsiders to reduce opportunism. A substantial
portion of innovative companies, however, maximize value by placing a
greater emphasis on proximate monitoring by insiders than SOX permits.
The law thus upsets the optimal governance balance in such companies,
and likely undermines their ability to provide the most value to investors
and consumers. In sum, innovation has specific characteristics which give
rise to an important governance tradeoff, and SOX likely impacts this
tradeoff to the detriment of innovation.
I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CORPORATE INNOVATION
Economic innovation is a process that ultimately results in something
new and valuable to consumers. Successful innovation generally consists
of discovering a new idea, developing it through a project, and then
commercializing the idea for profit.' ° Innovations include not only new
products for consumers (i.e., goods and services), but also new methods of
production and new forms of organization within firms. " Innovations may
10. See Jan Fagerberg, Innovation: A Guide to the Literature, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 8, at 4 ("Invention is the first occurrence of an idea
for a new product or process, while innovation is the first attempt to carry it out into
practice."); Federico Munari & Maurizio Sobrero, Corporate Governance and Innovation,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION 3 (Mario Calderini et
al. eds., 2003) (stating that innovation begins "with the generation of new knowledge
targeted to the discovery of new products and processes, and ending with their commercial
exploitation"); Barry Jaruzelski et al., Smart Spenders: The Global Innovation 1000,
STRATEGY & Bus., Dec. 14, 2006, at 1, 4 ("[H]igh-leverage innovators and the companies
with best overall performance distinguish themselves not by the money they spend, but by
the capabilities they demonstrate in ideation, project selection, development, or
commercialization"); Elizabeth Shaw et al., Corporate Entrepreneurship and Innovation
Part 2: A Role- and Processed-Based Approach, 8 EUR. J. INNOVATION MGMT. 393, 395
(2005) (stating that innovation involves an idea discovery phase and a commercialization
phase).
11. See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 85 (1985)
("Innovative activity consists in the creation . . . of an output, method of production, or
organization not hitherto in use.") (emphasis in original); MARY O'SULLIVAN, CONTESTS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 12 (2000) (finding that innovation generates "higher quality
and/or lower-cost products"); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS
CYCLE 66 (Redvers Opie trans., Transaction Publishers 1983) (1934) (noting that innovation
consists of new goods, new methods of production, exploitation of new markets and sources
of supply, and new forms of organization).
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entail incremental improvements to existing goods and methods of
production, or radically new products, processes, and organizational
forms. 12  However, innovation does not include mere changes in the
quantity of production or the location of transactions to more efficiently
meet consumer demand, unless some new underlying product, process, or
form is involved.
A. Innovation and Knowledge
At its most basic level, a business firm is a collection of productive
assets.13 Assets are inputs used to produce goods and services. 14 Assets
include physical goods such as inventory, buildings, and human capital, as
well as intangibles such as knowledge and organizational advantages.' 5
Assets become productive when employed in regularized production
routines. 16 The combination of assets, activities, and routines within a firm
gives rise to capabilities, which permit the achievement of particular
outcomes through coordinating activities. 17
Innovation is a capability that enables a firm to create something new,
and it is heavily dependent upon the utilization of intangible knowledge
assets. 18 Innovation stems from learning-generating new knowledge by
12. Astrid H. Lassen et al., The Nexus of Corporate Entrepreneurship and Radical
Innovation, 15 CREATIVITY & INNOVATION MGMT. 359, 360 (2006).
13. This view of the business firm stems from a resource-based approach to the firm.
See EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM 24 (1959)
(explaining that the firm is "a collection of productive resources the disposal of which
between different uses and over time is determined by administrative decision"); Kathleen
M. Eisenhardt & Jeffrey A. Martin, Dynamic Capabilities: What Are They?, 21 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 1105, 1105 (2000) (noting that the resource-based view of the firm "assumes that
firms can be conceptualized as bundles of resources, that those resources are
heterogeneously distributed across firms, and that resource differences persist over time").
14. Steven E. Phelan & Peter Lewin, Arriving at a Strategic Theory of the Firm, 2 INT'L
J. MGMT. REVIEWS 305, 312 (2000) (noting that under the Penrosian resource-based view of
the firm, "[r]esources are defined as inputs into the firm's operations that are used to
produce products or services").
15. Eisenhardt & Martin, supra note 13, at 1106-1107 (defining "resources" to include
physical, human and organizational assets).
16. A routine is a "regular and predictable behavioral patterns of firms." RICHARD R.
NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 14
(1982).
17. See Phelan & Lewin, supra note 14, at 312 ("A capability (or competency) is the
ability to perform a task or activity that involves complex patterns of co-ordination and co-
operation between people and other resources" and includes "research and development,
excellent customer service and high quality manufacturing.").
18. Roger J. Calantone et al., Learning Orientation, Firm Innovation Capability, and
Firm Performance, 31 INDUSTRIAL MARKETING MGMT. 515, 515-18 (2002) (reviewing
literature on organizational learning and innovation); Benn Lawson & Danny Samson,
Developing Innovation Capability in Organisations: A Dynamic Capabilities Approach, 5
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building upon existing knowledge.' 9 Innovation occurs when a firm
"transform[s] knowledge and ideas into new products, processes and
systems for the benefit of the firm and its stakeholders. 2 ° Much of the
knowledge from which innovation stems is tacit and "local," meaning that
such knowledge is unique to the company and the environment in which
the knowledge arises. 2 A successful innovation capability builds upon the
knowledge within the company to integrate new products or methods into
the firm's existing production and marketing capabilities. In addition, the
"absorptive capacity" of a firm to integrate external knowledge is crucial
for successful innovation.2 2  Ultimately, successfully leveraging and
managing new knowledge through innovation improves firm performance
to the benefit of investors and consumers.2 3
INT'L J. INNOVATION MGMT. 377, 382 (2001) (noting that leading innovators "[link]
organisational learning and knowledge" to production and view innovation "as a mechanism
for creating new knowledge").
19. See MARIO MORRONI, KNOWLEDGE, SCALE AND TRANSACTIONS IN THE THEORY OF
THE FIRM 233 (2006) ("Innovative activity can be regarded as a learning process.");
O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 12-14 (characterizing innovation as a cumulative learning
process based upon the existing "'common stock' of knowledge"); Shaw et al., supra note
10, at 396 ("[Clreativity assists in the emergence of new and novel ideas that will initiate
and support the innovation process .... Existing knowledge is important because, in order
to be creative, innovators must go beyond the established status quo .... "); Shaker A. Zahra
et al., Entrepreneurship and Dynamic Capabilities: A Review, Model and Research
Agenda, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 917, 932 (2006) (explaining that innovative "learning ...
depends on what [firms] already know").
20. See Lawson & Samson, supra note 18, at 384.
21. See Jackie Kraffl & Jaques-Laurent Ravix, The Governance of Innovative Firms:
An Evolutionary Perspective, 14 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 125, 135 (2005)
("Innovative firms develop specific production plans and are mainly endowed with local,
private and tacit knowledge."); Keith Pavitt, Innovation Processes, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 8, at 88 (noting that some of the knowledge learned
in the innovation process is firm-specific).
22. See Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New
Perspective on Learning and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 128, 128 (1990); Tunji
Adegbesan & Joan E. Ricart, What Do We Really Know About When Technological
Innovation Improves Performance (and When it Does Not)? 12-13 (IESE Bus. Sch., Univ.
of Navarra, Working Paper No. 668, 2007) ("[I]nnovativeness is dependent on a firm's
ability to leverage external knowledge, integrating it with its internal knowledge sources").
23. See William C. Bogner & Pratima Bansal, Knowledge Management as the Basis of
Sustained High Performance, 44 J. MGMT. STUD. 165, 169-72, 181-83 (2007) (discussing
the importance of new knowledge creation and continued development for firm
performance); see also Jaruzelski et al., supra note 10, at 11-12 (finding that "high-
leverage" innovators obtain more value from R&D spending and outperform rivals by
integrating all stages of the innovation process).
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B. Adapting to and Creating Economic Change
A business earns profits by generating revenues in excess of costs.
24
As economic change takes place over time, a firm's revenues and costs also
change.25  To the extent that economic change leads to higher costs or
lower revenues, firms must adapt their activities or suffer losses or lower
profits.26 For example, a higher quality product by a competitor may result
in lost business and require the company to produce a better product or face
lower sales. When economic change necessitates developing new products
or production methods, innovation is required.27 Innovation may be a
response to changes from within the firm (e.g., employee demographics) or
from changes external to the firm (e.g., consumer preferences, prices of
inputs, the conduct of competitors, or the opening of new markets).2"
As the pace of economic change and competitive pressures increase,
innovation becomes a necessary "cost of doing business."2 9 The incentive
24. A basic starting point for standard microeconomics is that firms attempt to
maximize profits by maximizing total revenues and minimizing total costs, requiring a firm
to produce a level of output such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. See ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 30-31 (4th ed. 2003).
25. See Mark Casson, Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm, 58 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 327, 333 (2005) (noting that some economic changes "are demand-related
and impact mainly on a firm's revenues, while others are supply-related and mainly affect a
firm's costs") (emphasis in original).
26. Total profits equals total revenues minus total costs, therefore a decrease in
revenues or increase in costs will lead to lower profits. See F. A. Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 523 (1945) ("[E]conomic problems arise
always and only in consequence of change. So long as things continue as before, or at least
as they were expected to, there arise no new problems requiring a decision, no need to form
a new plan."); Theodore W. Schultz, The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria, 13
J. ECON. LIT. 827, 827 (1975) ("No matter what part of a modem economy is being
investigated, we observe that many people are consciously reallocating their resources in
response to changes in economic conditions.").
27. See Lawson & Samson, supra note 18, at 378 (noting that innovation is "required
for adapting to changing markets, technologies and modes of competition."); Shaw et al.,
supra note 10, at 394 (noting that change is among the "key precipitating environmental
factors for innovation").
28. See PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRACTICE AND
PRINCIPLES 35 (1985) (outlining seven sources of innovation, including sources originating
from within the enterprise); Donald F. Kuratko & Michael H. Morris, Corporate
Entrepreneurship: The Dynamic Strategy for 21st Century Organizations, in ISSUES IN
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: CONTRACTS, CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS AND COUNTRY
DIFFERENCES, 2002 21, 28-30 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2003) (noting both external and internal
drivers of entrepreneurial activity in corporations); Casson, supra note 25, at 332-34
(introducing a typology of sources of economic volatility).
29. See Richard N. Langlois, Transaction-Cost Economics in Real Time, 1 INDUS. &
CORP. CHANGE 99 (1992) (noting that as "firms and markets learn" there arises a "kind of
information or knowledge cost-the cost of transferring the firm's capability to the market
or vice versa").
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to stay ahead of competition and preserve profits will induce an established
firm to innovate when the established firm's "failure to develop the
innovation means that new entrants almost certainly will." 30 Accordingly,
a firm may need to adopt innovation routines and make innovation a part of
its overall strategy for dealing with change.3'
In addition, firms can increase profits by using innovation to
proactively exploit change or create change. Proactive innovation "consists
in the purposeful and organized search for changes, and in the systematic
analysis of the opportunities such changes might offer for economic or
social innovation. 3 2  Indeed, proactively exploiting change for profit
constitutes the "overwhelming majority of successful innovations., 33 Even
where there is little or no change, innovators can introduce change to the
economy by creating higher quality or lower cost products or methods.
This process often leads to fundamental changes in industries and the
economy, and was famously characterized by economist Joseph
Schumpeter as "creative destruction. 34 The capability of a firn to create
change through innovation, like any other productive asset, is a source of
value to the business and its shareholders. For this reason, successful
innovation results in better economic performance,35 thereby making
investors better off.
30. DAVID BESANKO ET AL., ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY 437 (4th ed. 2007).
31. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 16, at 128-34; see Lassen et al., supra note 12, at
366 (explaining that the "flexibility" required for innovation entails "the ability to
incorporate change as a continuous consideration in the organization" such that change "is
perceived as a natural process"); James P. Andrew et al., Innovation 2007: A BCG
Management Survey 20 (2007), available at http://www.bcg.ch/fileadmin/media/
pdf/innovation..2007.pdf (noting that successful innovators "have seemingly
institutionalized the ability to innovate"); see also Kuratko & Morris, supra note 28 at 25
("[I]nnovation is the key to developing and successfully exploiting competitive
advantages."); Lawson & Samson, supra note 18, at 381 (noting that as the result of changes
in the marketplace "[i]nnovation represents today's competitive advantage").
32. DRUCKER, supra note 28, at 35; see also Lassen et al., supra note 12, at 361, 363-
67, 368 (explaining that a fundamental aspect of innovation is being proactive through
anticipating and pursuing new opportunities).
33. DRUCKER, supra note 28, at 35; see also Lawson & Samson, supra note 18, at 386
(discussing Cisco as an example of a company which employs strategies to use innovation
proactively, as opposed to reactively; such companies are more successful).
34. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (3rd ed.
1975) (1942).
35. RONALD S. JONASH & TOM SOMMERLATTE, THE INNOVATION PREMIUM: How NEXT
GENERATION COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING PEAK PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY 5-7
(1999); Leslie H. Vincent et al., Does Innovation Mediate Firm Performance? A Meta-
Analysis of Determinants and Consequences of Organizational Innovation 18 (2004),
available at https://www.smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/10731.
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C. Long-Term Risk-Taking
Compared to other types of investment projects undertaken by
corporations, innovation projects tend to be riskier and require longer-term
commitments.36 Innovation, by definition, involves something new and
unknown and therefore requires a firm to undertake R&D or other projects
with a high degree of uncertainty regarding their outcomes. 37 Furthermore,
substantial long-term investments are so important to successful innovation
that unsuccessful innovation may result simply from the failure to commit
sufficient assets for a long enough period.38 Successful commercialization
of particular innovations can be a process lasting several years and may
require sacrificing short-term profits to gain from more important sources
of company value in the long-term.39
Long-term innovation investments require employees to "commit their
skills and efforts to the pursuit of the goals of the enterprise rather than
selling their human capital on the open market., 40  Commitment by top
management, in particular, helps ensure successful radical innovation
because top managers are the principle instigators of long-term, strategic
decision-making. 41 Financial commitment is also often a precondition to
successful completion of a long-term innovation project. 4' Financial
36. Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 305,
309 (1989).
37. Mary O'Sullivan, Finance and Innovation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INNOVATION, supra note 8, at 257-58; Pavitt, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION,
supra note 8, at 88 ("Innovation is inherently uncertain, given the impossibility of predicting
accurately the cost and performance of a new artifact, and the reaction of users to it.").
38. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 20 ("[A] failure to generate returns at any point in
[the innovation process] may be a manifestation not of a failed innovative strategy, but of
the need to commit even more resources to an ongoing learning process."); Lawson &
Samson, supra note 18, at 381 (noting that "innovation is a force of instability, often
requiring long-term vision and commitment to yield results").
39. See, e.g., BESANKO et al., supra note 30, at 430 (noting that "JVC-Matsushita's
success in the VCR business was shaped by decisions and commitments that those firms
made 15 to 20 years before VCRs became commercially viable."); Mike Rogoway, Magic
Inside: Intel's Breakthrough, OREGONIAN, July 15, 2007 (reporting that Intel began work in
2003 on a microprocessor innovation that was completed in 2007), available at
http://blog.oregonlive.com/oregonianextra/2008/04/the-oregonians-pulitzer.-prize.htm;
Andrew et al., supra note 31, at 22 (noting that a managerial survey respondent attributed
Toyota's success in innovation to its "willing[ness] to forgo today's profit in order to
dominate the market later on").
40. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 60.
41. See Lassen et al., supra note 12, at 368 (arguing that top management commitment
is a determining factor in entrepreneurial success); see also infra note 67 and accompanying
text (arguing the necessity of management approval in entrepreneurial corporate exercises).
42. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 60 (explaining that financial institutions must
"support the ongoing access of a business organization to the financial resources required to
undertake and sustain the development and utilization of productive resources until such a
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commitment allows firms to capture revenues generated by innovation and
continue to innovate over time.43 In addition, a corporate culture that
tolerates failure and rewards long-term success can promote innovation by
preventing individuals from abandoning projects before they are
completed."
D. Corporate Entrepreneurship and Strategic Decision-Making
Entrepreneurship is an essential and fundamental aspect of innovation.
Accordingly, the relationship between corporate governance and corporate
entrepreneurship sheds much light on the relationship between governance
and innovation. 45  Entrepreneurship means to discover and utilize new
economic opportunities. 46  Entrepreneurship and innovation are closely
related, but not synonymous, concepts. While exploiting a new opportunity
may result in the creation of new products, production methods or
organizational forms (innovative entrepreneurship), it may also involve
activities that do not result in innovation, such as selling existing goods in a
new market (non-innovative entrepreneurship). In this sense, innovation is
a subcategory of entrepreneurship.
47  Therefore, innovation by public
companies occurs when corporate entrepreneurs produce new goods or
implement new production methods and forms of organization.
Corporate entrepreneurship has the same general features as
entrepreneurship practiced by individuals or by small, new firms.
time as these resources can generate returns").
43. Id. ("Only through continued investment can the depreciation or obsolescence of
existing productive resources-skills, knowledge, and physical assets-be counterbalanced
by the development of new skills, knowledge, and physical resources in order to sustain the
competitive advantage of the learning collectivity.").
44. See infra note 54 (discussing the importance of corporate culture).
45. Modem legal scholarship has generally paid little attention to entrepreneurship
theory. For a notable exception, see D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Law and
Entrepreneurship: Do Courts Matter?, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 353 (2006) (arguing
that common law systems revise their legal rules so as to promote capital formation and
entrepreneurship by new firms).
46. See Scott Shane & S. Venkataraman, The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of
Research, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217, 218 (2000) (noting that entrepreneurship research
involves "the study of sources of [economic] opportunities; the processes of discovery,
evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities, and the set of individuals who discover,
evaluate, and exploit them.") (emphasis in original); see also Casson, supra note 25, at 329
(finding "judgmental decision-making" to be the defining attribute of entrepreneurship in
the classic economic literature on the topic). Entrepreneurship is understood in different
ways by scholars, business professionals and policymakers, and entrepreneurship research
often reflects the varied approaches to entrepreneurship.
47. Lassen et al., supra note 12, at 360-61; see also Kuratko & Morris, supra note 28, at
25 ("[E]ntrepreneurship captures the full set of [opportunity pursuing] actions the firm takes
to create, renew, or innovate ....").
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However, it also has unique aspects due to the special structure and legal
treatment of corporations under U.S. law. There are two unique aspects of
corporate entrepreneurship relevant to corporate governance: the role of
the board of directors in facilitating organizational change and the role of
upper-level managers as entrepreneurial strategists. It should be noted that
although entrepreneurship is often regarded by policymakers and the public
as solely the domain of new business ventures (start-ups), large, well-
established firms such as corporations also practice entrepreneurship.48
Indeed, because of their superior access to resources, managerial skill, and
distribution networks, established corporations are often more effective
than small start-ups in exploiting new opportunities.49
Entrepreneurial corporations are those that discover, create, and
exploit economic opportunities5 °  Corporate entrepreneurship requires
decision makers to exercise judgment over how corporate resources should
be used in the face of uncertainty and how incentives should be structured
to make managers and other employees more likely to discover and act
upon entrepreneurial opportunities.5 1 Corporate entrepreneurship often
leads to innovation52 and requires the corporate entrepreneur to "assess new
opportunities" and "align and exploit resources" to further innovation. 3
Innovation and corporate entrepreneurship are encouraged by a corporate
culture where top management supports innovative activities; does not
micromanage investment projects; makes resources available to manager-
entrepreneurs; and tolerates, encourages, and rewards risk-taking and
failure."
48. See, e.g, DRUCKER, supra note 28, at 21-22 (noting that entrepreneurship requires a
firm to be more than just new and small, and identifying specific examples of large
entrepreneurial firms); Shane & Venkataraman, supra note 46, at 219 ("[E]ntrepreneurship
does not require, but can include, the creation of new organizations .... ").
49. DRUCKER, supra note 28, at 144; see also Peter F. Drucker, Foreword to VIJAY
SATHE, CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP: TOP MANAGERS AND NEW BUSINESS CREATION xi
("The great majority of new businesses during the last decades of the twentieth century...
were created and built by existing enterprises, and in large part by big or at least fair-sized
ones .... ).
50. See Shane & Venkataraman, supra note 46, at 218.
51. See Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein, Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of
the Firm: Any Gains from Trade?, in HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 55, 63
(2005) (explaining the exercise of entrepreneurial judgment in a firm setting).
52. See Kuratko & Morris, supra note 28, at 26 ("Corporate entrepreneurship represents
a framework for the facilitation of ongoing change and innovation in established
organizations.").
53. Shaw et al., supra note 10, at 394.
54. See SATHE, supra note 49, at 20-24 (showing that corporate entrepreneurship is
promoted when resources are sufficiently available, managers do not perceive a personal
risk in doing so and are not micromanaged); Jeffrey S. Hornsby et al., Middle Managers'
Perception of the Internal Environment for Corporate Entrepreneurship: Assessing a
Measurement Scale, 17 J. BUS. VENTURING 253, 256, 266-69 (2002) (arguing that corporate
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The board of directors is the modem corporation's principal
governance mechanism, enabling numerous interests and dispersed
information to be coordinated and processed among corporate actors.55
The three primary functions of a board are to monitor and hold top
management accountable, to be indirectly involved in operational decision
making (such as providing advice to top managers and setting broad
corporate policies), and to provide a network of contacts to the
corporation.56 Directors delegate their decision making authority and
control to top managers who, in turn, delegate their own decision making to
subordinate managers and employees.57 Just as all persons "can only
gather so much information from so many inputs before being
overloaded,"5 8 corporate entrepreneurs, in particular, have limited attention
spans they are able to devote to innovation as opposed to maintaining
existing production routines.s9  Delegated decision making facilitates
innovation by helping to ensure that corporate entrepreneurs can devote
sufficient time to innovation projects and not be distracted by other
concerns. 
60
Strategic decision making is an important activity that furthers
innovation. Strategic decision making means adopting "commitments,
decisions, and actions designed and executed to produce a competitive
advantage and earn above-average returns" on investment. 6' Whereas
strategic management focuses on more mundane goals such as monitoring
production routines for efficiency, strategic entrepreneurship focuses on
entrepreneurship in pursuit of innovation is promoted by top management support of
innovative activities, managerial autonomy, reward/incentive systems, availability of
resources and a clear understanding of job duties); Lassen et al., supra note 12, at 361, 363-
67, 368-69 (stating that flexibility and openness to change facilitate proactiveness and risk-
taking which further the development of substantial innovations); Lawson & Samson, supra
note 18, at 389-90 (noting that tolerance of ambiguity, empowered employees, time for
creativity and communication are elements of a corporate culture supporting innovation);
Andrew et al., supra note 31, at 10-11 (finding that top-level executives consider a risk-
averse corporate culture to be the most significant obstacle to innovation).
55. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 557-60, 573-74, 599-600 (2003)
56. See id. at 599; Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of
Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 801-07 (2003).
57. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2002).
58. Id. at 6.
59. Sharon Gifford, The Economics of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention, in 11 THE
SOURCES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY 123, 125-26 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 1999).
60. See Bainbridge, supra note 57, at 6 n.19 (noting that delegated decision making
through "branching hierarchies" efficiently limits the information to which corporate
supervisors are exposed).
61. Michael A. Hitt et al., Strategic Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial Strategies for
Wealth Creation, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 479, 480 (2001).
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discovering and utilizing new opportunities.62  The strategy of an
innovative corporation is to determine how to invest and develop assets to
produce new products and methods to outcompete rivals. 63  To achieve
innovation, strategic decisions should also foster long-term commitments
or else "interest and attention become too dispersed." 64  Strategic
innovation requires a company to fundamentally re-conceptualize its
existing business routines "to achieve dramatic value improvements for
customers and high growth" for itself.65 For example, in the mid 1990s
General Motors went beyond selling automobiles to also sell information
services through a hands-free on-board communications system called
OnStar.
66
Top managers are the decision makers primarily responsible for
strategic decision making and entrepreneurship. 67 However, the board of
directors also can play a role in strategy through strategic renewal, strategic
monitoring and, in certain cases, direct involvement in strategic
management. Strategic renewal is a process of internal change and
reorganization that results in organizational innovation.68 Organizational
innovation is important for established companies because, relative to small
or new firms, established firms have well-developed production routines.
Innovative public corporations need to be sufficiently flexible to change
routines because often "[t]he ability of an organization to innovate is a
62. Id. at 480-81; see Kuratko & Morris, supra note 28, at 26-28 (noting that corporate
entrepreneurship may be a component of a firm's strategic decisions with respect to rivals);
Steven Michael et al., Discovery and Coordination in Strategic Management and
Entrepreneurship, in STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP: CREATING A NEW MINDSET 44
(Michael A. Hitt et al. eds., 2002) (noting that entrepreneurial management "focuses on
identifying opportunity and mobilizing resources to take the firm in new directions with new
capabilities, products, or markets"); R. Duane Ireland et al., A Model of Strategic
Entrepreneurship: The Construct and its Dimensions, 29 J. MGMT. 963, 983 (2003) (noting
that strategic entrepreneurship involves opportunity- and advantage-seeking behavior).
63. See Lazonick, supra note 9, at 3-4, 10 (discussing the importance of innovation).
64. Lawson & Samson, supra note 18, at 389.
65. Bodo B. Schlegelmilch et al., Strategic Innovation: The Construct, its Drivers and
its Strategic Outcomes, 11 J. STRATEGIC MARKETING 117, 118 (2007).
66. VIJAY GOVINDARAJAN & CHRIS TRIMBLE, TEN RULES FOR STRATEGIC INNOVATORS:
FROM IDEA TO EXECUTION xviii (2005).
67. Donald F. Kuratko et al., Corporate Entrepreneurship Behavior Among Managers:
A Review of Theory, Research, and Practice, in CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 7, 10
(Jerome A. Katz & Dean A. Sheperd eds., 2004); Zahra et al., supra note 19, at 944.
68. See Donald F. Kuratko et al., A Model Of Middle Level Managers' Entrepreneurial
Behavior, 29 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 699, 701 (2005) (analyzing the
transformation of ongoing organizations through strategic renewal); Shaker A. Zahra,
Governance, Ownership, and Corporate Entrepreneurship: The Moderating Impact of
Industry Technological Opportunities, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1713, 1715 (1996) (noting that
corporate entrepreneurship includes strategic renewal activities such as "revitalizing the
company's operations by changing the scope of its business" and "building or acquiring new
capabilities and then creatively leveraging them to add value for shareholders").
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precondition for the successful utilization of inventive resources or new
technologies."69  For example, in the late 1980's, Samsung became a
leading innovator in computer memory chips, but would not have been able
to do so without first decentralizing its operations and consolidating certain
business units. 7
A board is more likely to play a significant role in strategic renewal
when a company is undertaking substantial structural changes and is
operating in a relatively uncertain economic environment. 7' Boards also
often engage in strategic monitoring, which includes evaluating
management's strategic choices after they are made and making broad
recommendations regarding strategy. 72 Boards rarely exercise a direct role
in strategic management. This is likely because outside directors acting in
a direct strategic capacity may harm performance with contributions that
are redundant, based on knowledge inferior to that of managers, or in
interference with the board's and management's other functions.7 3
E. Innovation and the Established Corporation
Established corporations possess inherent advantages and
disadvantages over other types of organizations in creating and utilizing
innovations. Established firms' advantages include possession of
complementary production and marketing resources, access to internal
capital, routines for innovation, and economies of scope and scale.74 On
the other hand, corporate innovation is "path dependent," meaning that its
course is constrained by prior commitments and established routines.
75
Established firms that have already invested in a particular product or
organizational capability may be reluctant to switch to a new technology
69. See Alice Lam, Organizational Innovation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INNOVATION, supra note 8, at 115.
70. BESANKO ETAL., supra note 30, at 531.
71. Kevin Hendry & Geoffrey C. Kiel, The Role of the Board in Firm Strategy:
Integrating Agency and Organisational Control Perspectives, 12 CORP. GOVERNANCE 500,
510 (2004) (noting that the strategic role of the board "help[s] an organization adapt to
environmental change" and that environmental uncertainty likely leads to directors asserting
more strategic control).
72. Dallas, supra note 56, at 807-08.
73. See id. The relationship between outside directors and innovation is explored in
detail in infra Part III.C.
74. See Scott Shane & Riitta Katila, When Are New Firms More Innovative Than
Established Firms? 3 (2003) (unpublished article, on file with the Robert H. Smith School
of Business) (reviewing the economics literature identifying reasons why established firms
may be more innovation than new firms).
75. BESANKO ET AL., supra note 30, at 443-45; see also Zahra et al., supra note 19, at
932 ("[L]eaming is a path dependent process wherein what firms learn depends on what
they already know.").
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for fear of taking away profits from their current products and lowering the
value of resources used to make those products.76 For example, from 2005
to 2006, Motorola allocated too many resources to maintaining its popular
RAZR cell phone and not enough to developing the next generation of
phones to stay ahead of competitors." Larger firms may also suffer from
organizational inertia and have trouble adapting to change. 8 In particular,
large established firms often have trouble integrating new products with
established routines and structures. 9 In a 2007 survey of approximately
2,500 top-level managers around the world, failing to implement an
innovation project quickly enough was identified as one of the most
significant barriers to successful innovation.8° Effective innovation thus
requires strategic renewal and other forms of adaptation and flexibility in
order to properly and timely incorporate new processes and products.8'
When an established corporation undertakes innovation successfully,
it is generally an organization-wide effort. While certain aspects of the
process, such as R&D or product development, may be segregated into
discrete units and operated by actors not involved in other aspects of the
company's operations,8 2 corporate assets involved in the innovation
process encompass numerous aspects of a company's operations and
76. BESANKO ET AL., supra note 30, at 436.
77. Christopher Rhoads & Li Yuan, How Motorola Fell a Giant Step Behind-As it
Milked Thin Phone, Rivals Sneaked Ahead on the Next Generation, WALL ST. J., April 27,
2007, at Al.
78. Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, Structural Inertia and Organizational
Change, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 149, 149 (1984); see also Holmstrom, supra note 36, at 306
(finding that "the large corporation has emerged primarily to serve production and
marketing goals and that in pursuing those objectives effectively it has to organize in a way
that compromises innovation incentives"); Jesper B. Sorensen & Toby E. Stuart, Aging,
Obsolescence, and Organizational Innovation, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 81 (2000) (describing the
effects of "aging" on innovation).
79. See Deborah Dougherty & Trudy Heller, The Illegitimacy of Successful Product
Innovation in Established Firms, 5 ORG. Sci. 200, 214 (1994) (finding that a common
barrier to innovation exists where "the constituent activities of new product development do
notfit into, or are not a part of, the legitimate system of thought and action in multiple, if
subtle, ways") (emphasis in original); Wim Vanhaverbeke & Nico Peeters, Embracing
Innovation as Strategy: Corporate Venturing, Competence Building and Corporate
Strategy Making, 14 CREATIVITY & INNOVATION MGMT. 246, 247 (2005) (explaining that
large firms must develop new capabilities to capitalize on new products or technologies).
80. Andrew et al., supra note 31, at 10-11, 17-19.
81. Nils Stieglitz & Klaus Heine, Innovations and the Role of Complementarities in a
Strategic Theory of the Firm, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 5 (2007); David J. Teece et al.,
Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509, 515 (1997).
82. See Phillipe Aghion & Jean Tirole, The Management ofInnovation, 109 Q. J. ECON.
1185, 1206 (1994) ("[W]hen intellectual inputs dominate as for software and biotechnology,
research will often be performed by independent units .... "); see also DRUCKER, supra note
28, at 174 (stating that innovative firms should not "put the entrepreneurial into the existing
managerial component .... [Nor] make innovation an objective for people charged with
running, exploiting, optimizing what already exists").
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governance structure. In the context of an established corporation,
innovation is
a set of interwoven processes... [that] are multiple, overlapping
and performed by a multitude of different actors inside and
outside companies, with a distribution of actions and decision
making at different organizational levels . . . related both to
higher-level structural organizational arrangements, and to lower-
level microbehavioural attainments.83
Accordingly, the activities of the researchers, directors, managers, and
advertisers required to successfully complete an innovation project are
interdependent.14 Learning and communicating the new knowledge needed
for innovation requires coordinating the activities within a company. 5 For
example, when BMW begins to develop a new model automobile,
employees from departments as diverse as engineering, design, marketing,
purchasing, and finance are brought together to a centralized location to
facilitate coordination of their activities.
86
II. INNOVATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Because innovation requires coordination of activities on a company-
wide basis, it is affected by corporate governance structures and policies
applicable to the entire organization.87  Based upon the defining
83. Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 3-4; see also Deborah Dougherty & Cynthia
Hardy, Sustained Product Innovation in Large, Mature Organizations: Overcoming
Innovation-to-Organization Problems, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1120, 1123 (1996) ("Each
innovation project also needs administrative structures and processes appropriate to its
development stage and access to decision making across the organization.").
84. See Jan Fagerberg, Innovation: A Guide to the Literature, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 8, at 13 (describing innovation as a systemic process
comprised of "a set of activities (or actors) that are interlinked"); Keith Pavitt, Innovation
Processes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 8, at 88 (describing
innovation within large corporations as a series of several overlapping processes); Stieglitz
& Heine, supra note 81, at 5 (explaining that "individual learning processes [involved with
innovation] are themselves interdependent and require coordination").
85. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 14-17 (observing that working with other people
creates new opportunities to learn outside an individual's personal work and experience);
Shaw et al., supra note 10, at 400 (observing that social interaction is necessary for the
effective exchange of resources and information).
86. Special Report: The World's Most Innovative Companies, BUSiNESSWEEK, April
24, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
0617/b3981401 .htm.
87. See Langlois, supra note 29, at 106 (1992) ("How the firm is organized-how the
routines of the humans and machines are linked together-is also part of a firm's
capabilities. Indeed, 'skills, organization, and "technology" are intimately intertwined in a
functioning routine, and it is difficult to say exactly where one aspect ends and another
begins."').
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characteristics of innovation and how innovation is practiced by
corporations, this Part identifies the types of governance structures that
support innovation. Generally, structures that support innovation are
designed to prevent managers from acting myopically to achieve short-term
outcomes with relatively low risk. However, innovation-facilitating
governance structures may also allow managers to act opportunistically and
benefit themselves at the expense of investors. To maximize shareholder
value while facilitating innovation, a company must choose the right
balance between employing outside monitors to reduce opportunism and
utilizing proximate monitors to reduce myopia.
A. Governance Structures and Shareholder Value
Corporate governance consists of the rules, entities, and processes that
govern how corporations use their assets to generate and distribute
revenues among shareholders, employees, and other parties.88 A primary
type of governance structure comes from corporate law, which consists of:
"Off-the-rack" state statutes giving rise to the unique corporate form;
employment and compensation contracts, corporate charters, and by-laws;
regulations, such as those mandating disclosure to publicly raise capital;
and the holdings of court decisions defining the meaning of such rules and
establishing fiduciary and other duties among the relevant parties.
89
Monitoring and disciplining entities is also a type of governance structure,
both internal to the corporation (such as the board of directors) and external
to it (such as federal regulators, auditors, and securities analysts). A third
type of structure arises from competitive processes such as the market for
corporate control, which constrains and alters the behavior of directors and
managers through mechanisms such as hostile takeovers and proxy
contests. The ultimate goal of any system of corporate governance is to
maximize the wealth of stockholders. 90
88. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at I ("[A] system of corporate governance shapes
who makes investment decisions in corporations, what types of investments they make, and
how returns from investments are distributed.").
89. See, e.g., Gillian Hadfiled & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of
Corporate Law, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 416-17 (2006) (describing the types of services
that constitute "corporate law"); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate
Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 277-78 (1996) (explaining that corporate
governance institutions are "established or policed by corporate law .... [A]s the legal
regime sets the parameters for all corporate governance mechanisms").
90. Bainbridge, supra note 55, at 574-84; see also Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d
873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to
maximize the long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders."); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001)
(describing the scholarly consensus that "the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of
aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder
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In the United States, significant aspects of corporate law are
"enabling" as opposed to mandatory, meaning that corporations may
choose their own governance structures from a default set of rules provided
by state incorporation statutes. 91 In practice, corporations avail themselves
of this ability by adopting a variety of different governance mechanisms.
Transaction cost economics provides a basic rationale for the diversity in
governance structures-those structures aligned with transaction-specific
characteristics have performance advantages over less well-aligned
structures. 92  Transaction cost economics identifies the important
characteristics of transactions, how those characteristics give rise to
particular types of transaction costs, and then identifies what governance
structure reduces the costs of undertaking transactions and increases
productive output.
93
The alignment of governance structures with transactions based upon
their specific characteristics also holds at the firm level. The empirical
corporate governance literature largely finds that a corporation's choice of
governance structure is a result of its firm-specific characteristics. In other
words, governance mechanisms are endogenously determined by firm
attributes.9 4 Furthermore, companies generally choose structures that
interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests"); Jean Tirole, Corporate
Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 1 (2001) ("The standard definition of corporate
governance among economists and legal scholars refers to the defense of shareholders'
interests."); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law 3 (Eur.
Corp. Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 44/2005, 2005) ("[T]he benchmark for evaluating the
benefit of corporate and securities laws is whether they improve investor welfare.").
91. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 2-3 (Harvard University Press 1996) (1991) (observing that in almost
every state the corporate code acts as an enabling statute).
92. See Robert J. David & Shin-Kap Han, A Systematic Assessment of the Empirical
Support for Transaction Cost Economics, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 39, 40 (2004) (noting that
the central claim of transaction cost economics is "that transactions will be handled in such
a way as to minimize the costs involved in carrying them out"); Oliver E. Williamson,
Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization, 12 STRATEGIC. MGMT. J. 75, 79
(1991) (identifying the main task of the transaction cost theory of the firm as "align[ing]
transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their
costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost economizing) way").
93. David & Han, supra note 92, at 40-41.
94. See Chidambaran et al., supra note 2, at 28-29 (concluding from the impact of
changes in governance structures on firm value that "firms are endogenously optimizing
their governance structure in response to observable and unobservable firm characteristics");
James S. Linck et al., The Determinants of Board Structure, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 308, 309
(2008) (finding that "firms structure their boards in ways consistent with the costs and
benefits of monitoring and advising by the board," which varies across different types of
firms); M. Babajide Wintoki et al., Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Corporate Governance
4-6 (Oct. 11, 2007) (unpublished research paper, on file with University of Georgia, Terry
College of Business), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=970986 (finding no significant relationship between board
composition, board size, board leadership, insider ownership and firm performance). But
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maximize overall firm value, as opposed to choosing structures that benefit
managers or some other corporate constituency. 95 Accordingly, there is no
set of "good" governance structures that can be universally adopted to
make investors in firms with different characteristics better off.96 Because
innovative firms often share similar characteristics, they adopt similar
governance mechanisms to facilitate innovation.
B. Governance Structures Supporting Innovation
Because a firm's choice of governance devices is in large part a
response to transaction- or firm-specific characteristics, the economic
characteristics of innovation and of innovative firms provide insight as to
what structures facilitate (or undermine) innovation. Furthermore, because
corporations generally choose governance structures in order to maximize
performance (and hence, value to shareholders), the governance devices
adopted by firms that successfully innovate provide insight into how
innovation should be governed. Based upon the characteristics of
innovation identified in Part I, as well as a large body of literature
analyzing the characteristics of successful innovative firms, two
fundamental structures that facilitate innovation can be identified: (1)
decentralization which facilitates the generation and communication of
knowledge, and affords companies the flexibility required to adapt to
change; and (2) an emphasis on strategic internal control which promotes
long-term risk-taking.
see Reena Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson, Did New Regulations Target the Relevant
Corporate Governance Attributes?, 24, 28-29 (April 14, 2006) (unpublished research paper,
on file with Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=891411 (finding that governance
structures and firm value are not endogenously determined).
95. See Audra L. Boone et al., The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and
Composition: An Empirical Analysis, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 66, 69 (2007) (finding results which
"indicate that board size and composition vary across firms and change over time to
accommodate the specific growth, monitoring, and managerial characteristics of the firm");
Chidambaran et al., supra note 2, at 34-36; Linck et al., supra note 94, at 309 (finding the
results of testing what firm-specific attributes are correlated with what board structures to be
"generally consistent with efficiency explanations of the determinants of board structure");
Wintoki, supra note 94, at 4-6 (finding no significant relationship between board
composition, board size, board leadership, insider ownership and firm performance).
96. See J. Harold Mulherin, Corporations, Collective Action and Corporate
Governance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 124 PUB. CHOICE 179, 199 (2005) ("The central
policy implication of the prior research and new supporting evidence is that one size does
not fit all in corporate governance"); Chidambaran et al., supra note 2, at 5-6 (finding that
good and bad changes in governance structures lead to both positive and negative
performance changes, no differences in performance between firms that have good or bad
changes, and that corporations with good governance do not outperform those with worse
governance).
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As a matter of first principle, because innovation is dependent upon
the proper utilization of tacit and particularized knowledge, 97 innovation
requires corporate activities to be organized so that knowledge is generated
and communicated to the appropriate decision makers."5 Companies
should thus be structured to decrease the costs of generating knowledge and
communicating it within the firm. 99 Furthermore, governance devices
should also create opportunities and incentives to learn, communicate, and
allocate decision making to those directors or managers with the
knowledge most relevant for a given task.'00 When economic activity
depends upon the generation and communication of tacit or firm-specific
knowledge, outside monitoring and centralized decision-making are
generally of limited value. This is because tacit and particularized
knowledge is costly to communicate, especially to those lacking familiarity
with the context in which the knowledge arose. 101
Accordingly, knowledge-generation and communication tend to
benefit from the adoption of decentralized governance structures, or those
97. See supra Part I.A.
98. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 20-21, 22-23, 36-37 (explaining the importance
of organization to utilizing the knowledge involved with innovation); trica Gorga &
Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a
Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (2007) (noting that
two functions served by economic organization are the production of knowledge and
communication or "diffusion" of that knowledge).
99. See Nicolai J. Foss, The Emerging Knowledge Governance Approach: Challenges
and Characteristics, 14 ORG. 29, 45 (2007) ("As a practical and normative enterprise,
knowledge governance means deploying governance mechanismses [sic] that mitigate the
costs of sharing, integrating and creating knowledge .... ).
100. See Nicola Lacetera, Corporate Governance and the Governance of Innovation:
The Case of Pharmaceutical Industry, 5 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 29, 38 (2001)
(explaining that to support innovation "decision-makers should have appropriate
information about [a] firm's operations" and incentives should be in place so persons share
knowledge and competencies).
101. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 16, at 125 (noting the "severe limits on
articulation [in the case] of organizational knowledge"); Walter W. Powell & Stine Grodal,
Networks of Innovators, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 8, at 76
(noting that the type of knowledge typically leading to innovation is "very 'sticky' and
contains a large tacit component [such that] the degree of difficulty and the costs of transfer
are high"); Foss, supra note 99, at 46 (noting that because of the tacit nature of much
knowledge, "delegation of the right to initiate, carry out, etc. knowledge sharing with
colleagues seems to be an efficient alternative to instructing employees to share specific
knowledge" through a centralized decision-making mechanism); see also Milton Harris &
Artur Raviv, A Theory of Board Control and Size, REV. FIN. STuD. 33-35 (forthcoming
2008) (showing that insider control of boards is optimal when knowledge possessed by
insiders is beyond a threshold level of importance beyond knowledge possessed by
outsiders); Charu G. Raheja, Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of
Corporate Boards, 40 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 283, 285 (2005) (showing that the
optimal number of outsiders on the board decreases as monitoring or "verification" costs
increase).
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structures giving corporate agents, such as managers and their subordinates,
more discretion.'0 2  An essential component of decentralization in the
corporate context consists of allocating decision making authority to
insiders who have superior knowledge about the company and its
environment.' °3  Innovation is thus furthered when "the allocation of
corporate resources and returns is in the hands of decision-makers who are
integrated with the learning process that generates innovation."'10 4  For
example, innovative companies seem to benefit from having a relatively
high proportion of board members that are also company insiders (i.e.,
employees). 105
Decentralized governance facilitates not only knowledge-utilization,
but also the type of organizational flexibility that innovation requires. 106 In
adapting to ongoing economic change, a "manager must be endowed with
sufficient elements of discretion in order to organize the coordination of
innovative investments."' 10 7  In particular, changing and adapting
organizational structures requires that managers have "control and decision
rights over the firm's assets, including the rights to redefine and reallocate
specific use and decision rights."'0 8 In other words, substantial managerial
discretion facilitates strategic renewal and organizational innovation.'09 In
102. See Nicolai J. Foss & Keld Laursen, Performance Pay, Delegation and Multitaksing
Under Uncertainty and Innovativeness: An Empirical Investigation, 58 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 246, 264-65 (2005) (finding that employees often have greater authority delegated to
them and are less restricted in their activities in dynamic and innovative environments);
Robert M. Grant, Toward A Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
109, 119 (1996) ("The principle of co-location requires that decisions based upon such tacit
and idiosyncratic knowledge are decentralized, while decisions requiring statistical
knowledge are centralized."); Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, A Knowledge-Based
Theory of the Firm-The Problem-Solving Perspective, 15 ORG. Scl. 617, 626 (2004)
(arguing that decentralized consensus-based hierarchy "achieves extensive knowledge
transfer by enhancing the efficiency with which knowledge transfer occurs among actors
within the firm"); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy 3, 19 (Jan. 27,
1999) (unpublished article, on file with World Bank) ("In the firm, moving from simple
repetitive work under central control (Taylorism) to more complex knowledge-based work
requires a move towards a more decentralized and participative workplace.").
103. See MICHAEL C. JENSEN & WILLIAM H. MECKLING, FOUNDATIONS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 106 (1998) ("When knowledge is valuable in decision making,
there are benefits to colocating decision authority with the knowledge that is valuable to
those decisions.").
104. O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 60.
105. See infra Part III.C.
106. Teece et al., supra note 81, at 515.
107. Krafft & Ravix, supra note 21, at 140.
108. Stieglitz & Heine, supra note 81, at 7.
109. See id. at 7-8 (noting that "[i]f general management is not permitted to change
organizational structures and experiment with new ways of doing things, the development of
new corporate assets may be seriously hampered"); Zahra et al., supra note 19, at 941, 950
(arguing that established firms change their existing capabilities through planned change
which in turn enables strategic renewal).
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addition, managerial discretion facilitates integration of new products and
processes with established routines, especially when major innovations
require a company to make a significant change in organizational structure
or change how production processes are carried out." l  In sum,
decentralization helps companies to utilize knowledge, adapt to and
promote economic change, engage in strategic renewal, and integrate new
products into existing routines.
In addition to facilitating the utilization of knowledge to promote
innovation, governance must encourage commitment to long-term risk-
taking. The most straightforward governance devices facilitating long-term
innovation activities are compensation contracts giving managers monetary
incentives to take long-term risks. "' Incentive compensation in the form of
stock, stock options, or bonuses tied to longer-term measures of
performance can successfully promote long-term risk-taking." 2 However,
compensation schemes with the goal of promoting innovation are
inherently limited. Because innovation is a long-term and organization-
wide process often involving numerous persons, it is difficult to measure an
individual's precise contribution to innovation and hence compensate them
appropriately." 3  Furthermore, compensation schemes use financial
indicators of success and therefore may lead managers to focus on more
110. See Stieglitz & Heine, supra note 81, at 6 (arguing that formal organizational
structures are less important for integrating more substantial "modular" and "radical"
innovations, and that management needs substantial control to change organizational
structures); Teece et al., supra note 81, at 521 (noting that decentralization and local
autonomy assist the processes of "reconfiguration and transformation"); see also Dougherty
& Hardy, supra note 83, at 1121-22 (noting that successful innovation requires connecting
innovations with existing routine operations).
111. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 60 ("[Tlhe prospects of sharing in the gains of
successful innovation by the investing organization can lead even mobile participants to
forgo the lure of the market and remain committed to the pursuit of organizational goals.");
Lawson & Samson, supra note 18, at 382 ("Leading innovators encourage, expect and
reward innovation from everywhere within the organisation .... "); Stieglitz & Heine, supra
note 81, at 6-7 (finding that incentive to invest in innovative assets is greater when the
decision-maker owns the assets); see also Andrew Tylecote & Paulina Ramirez, Corporate
Governance and Innovation: The U.K. Compared with the US. and "Insider" Economies,
35 REs. POL'Y 160, 162 (2006) (arguing that innovation is facilitated when corporate
governance enables the firm to appropriate returns).
112. See Vincent L. Barker III & George C. Mueller, CEO Characteristics and Firm
R&D Spending, 48 MGMT. Sci. 782, 793 (2002) (finding that "greater stock ownership by
the CEO was associated with higher R&D spending"); Jeffrey L. Coles et al., Managerial
Incentives & Risk-Taking, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 464 (2006) (finding that "higher sensitivity
to stock price volatility in the managerial compensation scheme gives executives the
incentive to ... invest in riskier assets" such as more investment in R&D).
113. See Jennifer Francis & Abbie Smith, Agency Costs and Innovation: Some
Empirical Evidence, 19 J. ACCT. & ECON. 383, 385 (1995) (noting that the difficulty in
measuring innovation "hinders the design of incentive contracts which are effective at
spurring inventive activity").
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predictable and easily measured short-term activities. 114
As an alternative to compensation devices to promote innovation, a
corporation may de-emphasize short-term or financial measures of success.
Management scholars distinguish between strategic and financial internal
control systems. The first type of control "emphasize[s] largely subjective
and sometimes intuitive criteria for evaluation.""' Financial controls, by
contrast, employ objective evaluation criteria such as return on
investment. 116 While both types of controls facilitate innovation, a
significant emphasis on strategic control is required for sustained
innovation because strategic controls focus on and evaluate long-term
performance, establish risk-taking norms, and reward activities resulting in
innovation." '7 As explained by Munari and Sobrero, "if managers know
that they will be evaluated on neither short-term commitments nor
immediately measurable achievements, they could have higher incentives
to leverage their tacit knowledge of internal entrepreneurial resources and
support longer-term development plans."
'"18
By contrast, a relatively high emphasis on financial control
undermines innovation because, within the context of quarterly and annual
disclosure requirements mandated by federal securities laws, periodically
reported financial data are necessarily tied to short-term outcomes. Over-
emphasizing financial control may inhibit the communication of tacit and
local knowledge that is not subject to straightforward measurement and
quantification in financial reports. "9 Of course, companies do and may
even need to improve their internal measures of innovation. 20 However,
innovation may be undermined if companies increase their measurement of
innovation as part of a general shift toward emphasizing short-term
114. See, e.g., Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 11 (observing that financial
indicators offer objectivity but are short term in nature, causing managers to move towards
low risk strategies effecting long-term growth and returns); Gustavo Manso, Motivating
Innovation 1 (Jan. 2, 2006) (unpublished research paper, on file with Northwestern
University Kellogg School of Management), available at
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edulfinance/faculty/seminars/mansoO 11306.pdf (noting
that pay-for-performance compensation "encourages the repetition of what has worked in
the past, but not the exploration of new untested approaches").
115. Michael A. Hitt et al., The Market for Corporate Control and Firm Innovation, 39
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1084, 1090 (1996).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1095.
118. Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 10.
119. Id. at 11; see also Judith L. Estrin, President and CEO, Packet Design LLC,
Remarks at Managing Innovation Wall Street Journal Panel (Sept. 24, 2007), available at
http://video.aol.com/video-detail/risk-and-innovation/369664101 (noting that "all of the
[formal processes] that companies have [implemented] for quality and efficiency are
essentially enemies of innovation" and that successful innovation requires "being able to
make judgment calls without a lot of data").
120. See generally Andrew et al., supra note 31.
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financial outcomes to the detriment of measuring the full range of inputs,
processes, and outputs making up the innovation process.' 2'
C. Objective Versus Proximate Monitoring
Innovation is thus facilitated by decentralization and an emphasis on
strategic internal control. These structures can increase value to
shareholders because they reduce an important type .of agency cost faced by
innovative firms. Agency costs are a measure of the loss in value to
shareholders (the principals) from directors and managers (the agents)
failing to act in the best interests of shareholders. 1
2
One type of agency cost comes from managers failing to proactively
use assets to benefit shareholders. To the extent a company has the
potential to gain from innovation, shareholders are better off when
managers undertake actions to adapt to economic change and commit
themselves to long-term projects. However, these activities are relatively
risky for managers to undertake because they require commitment to
projects whose short-term returns are uncertain. Whereas shareholders can
diversify their investment portfolios, the risks corporate managers face are
non-diversifiable. Accordingly, managers have a tendency to take on less
risk and other innovation-related activities than shareholders desire.
23
Managers may focus on short-term gains, more objectively demonstrable
performance, and maintaining current production routines rather than on
long-term innovation projects and strategic renewal. 124 If managers are too
myopic, focusing on short-term financial outcomes when they could be
engaging in innovation, shareholders bear an agency cost from foregone
benefits. Firms with a high innovation potential thus bear myopia costs
from managers who systematically fail to invest in innovation. To reduce
121. See id. 15-17.
122. Agency costs are the economic measure of the divergence of interests between
managers and shareholders. Such costs include: those borne by shareholders to monitor,
control and give managers appropriate incentives; those bome by managers to convince
shareholders they will act in their best interests (bonding costs); and the loss from any
remaining gap between their interests (the residual loss). Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). For a list of some factors affecting the size of
agency costs, see id. at 328-29.
123. See Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that managers are generally risk
averse and use strategies that increase short-term returns but decrease long-term gains); see
also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 122, at 313 (noting that "as the manager's ownership
claim falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as searching
out new profitable ventures falls").
124. Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 5-6, 9; Holmstrom, supra note 36, at 324-25
(finding that insufficient risk-taking exists in large public corporations because of
management's tendency to choose projects with more easily measurable short-term returns).
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myopia and to facilitate innovation, innovative firms may increase
decentralization and adopt more strategic control mechanisms.
While decentralization and strategic control may facilitate innovation,
however, these structures may not maximize overall value to shareholders.
This is because a firm adopting such structures may increase agency costs
from managers opportunistically misusing shareholder funds to obtain
private benefits.125 In general, greater informational asymmetries between
managers and their monitors (e.g., independent directors and investors)
increase managerial opportunism. Asymmetries give managers the ability
to benefit themselves because in such situations the costs of monitoring are
high and it is difficult for outside monitors to evaluate management's
conduct. 126 Innovation activities are difficult to measure or evaluate in the
short-run, in part because they utilize tacit and particularized knowledge
and therefore create information asymmetries between corporate monitors
and managers.' 27 Accordingly, to the extent they increase information
asymmetries, governance structures that facilitate innovation may increase
the ability of managers to behave opportunistically. For example,
undertaking R&D allows managers to entrench themselves against
newcomers, forego dividend payments to shareholders, and invest in
projects that benefit themselves at the expense of the company.'28
125. See Oliver Hart, Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, 105
ECON. J. 678, 681 (1995) (discussing how the need for corporate governance arises from the
combination of agency costs and incomplete contracts); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 122,
at 312, 325 (arguing that limitations on managerial discretion reflect a tradeoff between
"impos[ing] costs on the firm because they limit [a manager's] ability to take full advantage
of some profitable opportunities" such as those exploited through entrepreneurship, and
benefiting the firm by "limiting [a manager's] ability to harm the stockholders while making
himself better off'); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control,
93 VA. L. REv. 789, 791 (2007) (noting that delegation of decision-making to a board of
directors "while increasing agency costs [from opportunism], also promotes efficient and
informed decisionmaking, discourages intershareholder opportunism, and encourages
valuable specific investment in corporate team production").
126. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 21
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004) (noting that a core agency problem arises because "the
agent commonly has better information than does the principal about the relevant facts,
[and] the principal cannot costlessly assure himself that the agent's performance is precisely
what was promised. As a consequence, the agent has an incentive to act opportunistically..
. ."). This dynamic is well developed in the corporate governance literature dealing with the
optimal portion of outside directors on a board. See Boone et al., supra note 95, at 70-71
(describing various formulations of the "monitoring hypothesis" which includes the view
that "firms facing greater information asymmetry will have smaller and less independent
boards because of the higher costs of monitoring").
127. See David Aboody & Baruch Lev, Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider
Gains, 55 J. FIN. 2747, 2749-50 (2000) (identifying the idiosyncratic nature R&D
investment that gives rise to relatively high information asymmetries).
128. See Kee H. Chung et al., Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Capital
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To maximize value to shareholders, therefore, a firm must choose
between reducing agency costs from myopia and reducing those from
opportunism. 2 9 With respect to choosing monitoring devices, this choice
gives rise to the fundamental governance tradeoff between proximate and
objective monitoring. As identified by Arnoud Boot and Jonathan Macey,
Proximity exists when monitors maintain close contact with
management and participate in important decisions on a real-time
basis. Objectivity exists when monitors ... remain distant from
management and evaluate management's performance without
influence by management.
A tradeoff between monitoring functions exists because monitors
that obtain close proximity necessarily forego objectivity, and
objective monitors must maintain sufficient distance from
management, which results in a loss of the advantages of
proximity. 130
As compared to outside monitors, proximate monitors better facilitate
knowledge generation and communication because their close contact with
management and real-time participation in decision making means that they
have more knowledge about the company and are in a better position to
communicate tacit knowledge efficiently. Likewise, proximate monitors
are in a better position to mitigate the informational asymmetries involved
with giving substantial discretion to decision-makers to adapt to change.
The more in-depth knowledge of proximate monitors also endows them
and R&D Investments, 12 REv. FIN. ECON. 161, 162 (2003) ("It is well known that, absent
monitoring and bonding, corporate executives can and often do make suboptimal investment
decisions in order to maximize their own utility at the expense of shareholders.
Consequently, the level of capital and R&D expenditures per se may not be a proper
indicator to judge the effect of those expenditures on firm value."); Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific
Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 123-32 (1989) (describing managerial incentives to invest
in projects involving manager-specific knowledge so as to increase the cost of replacing the
manager); see also Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 13 ("[T]he decision to carry on
R&D activities inherently involves high agency costs, since R&D projects are typically
risky, unpredictable, long-term oriented and multistage, labour intensive and
idiosyncratic."); Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, Empire Builders and
Shirkers: Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 489,
489-515 (reviewing theories of agency costs from empire building); Zahra, supra note 68, at
1716 ("High R&D spending may also reflect high agency costs, with managers attempting
to keep funds within a firm rather than distribute them to shareholders.").
129. See Foss & Klein, supra note 51, at 73 (noting that "various constraints firms
impose on employees. .. to curb destructive entrepreneurship [e.g., opportunism] may have
the unwanted side effect that productive entrepreneurship is stifled"); Holmstrom, supra
note 36, at 322-23 (noting that increasing monitoring and influence over managers
undermines innovation).
130. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance:
The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL
L. REv. 356, 357 (2004).
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with greater capabilities to employ strategic control mechanisms to
evaluate and steer the long-term progress of innovation projects. In this
sense, proximate monitoring encompasses the activity of strategic
monitoring, except that proximate monitoring also takes place as projects
are being undertaken, not just after the fact. Proximate monitoring is
therefore the type of monitoring most aligned with decentralization and
strategic control in reducing myopia and facilitating innovation. While
proximate monitoring may be strongest when undertaken by company
insiders such as executive managers, outsiders (e.g., institutions with
concentrated ownership of shares) may also engage in proximate
monitoring.
Proximate monitoring entails a potential cost, however, because
proximate monitors may be "captured" by management and thus fail to
evaluate managers in the best interests of shareholders.'31 Management
capture increases informational asymmetries and thereby increases
opportunism costs. To reduce opportunism costs, a corporation may
increase objective monitoring of managers. Objective monitoring
structures, in contrast to structures facilitating proximate monitoring,
include increasing the portion of independent directors on a board and
placing a greater emphasis on internal control over financial reporting."'
Subjecting agents to civil and criminal liability may also reduce agency
costs incurred through misappropriation of assets and fraud. Yet because
there is a tradeoff between proximate and objective monitoring, increasing
objective monitoring likely comes at the expense of increasing myopia and
reducing innovation activity.
How a value-maximizing company should strike the balance between
objective and proximate monitoring depends in part upon whether it suffers
from relatively higher agency costs from myopia or from opportunism. All
things being equal, investors in companies with high innovative potential
will likely benefit more from proximate monitoring than objective
monitoring. As corporations become extremely large and diversified in
their operations, however, the potential for opportunism may outweigh the
costs from myopia such that an emphasis on objective monitoring is
preferable even amidst a high level of innovation.' 33 Thus, the proper mix
of objective and proximate monitoring that maximizes value to
shareholders will differ among public companies.
131. Id. at 359.
132. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 122, at 323.
133. See Boone et al., supra note 95, at 71 (reviewing corporate governance literature
which finds that "[t]he net benefits of extra [objective] monitoring increase with managers'
opportunities to consume private benefits [i.e., act opportunistically], but decrease with the
cost of monitoring" such that "optimal boards will employ large numbers of outside
directors, and be larger in overall size, when managers' private benefits are high and the
cost of monitoring is low").
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III. THE IMPACT OF SOX AND RELATED REFORMS
SOX and related corporate governance reforms are the most wide-
ranging and extensive rules to apply to public companies since passage of
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.134
Evidence thus far demonstrates that SOX likely had a disproportionate and
negative impact on the shareholders of smaller public companies.'35 This
Part suggests that the cumulative impact of SOX may also have a
disproportionate and negative impact on the stakeholders of innovative
public companies. While any one of the effects of SOX described below
may not be significant when taken in isolation, when combined, their net
effect likely undermines the innovative potential of a significant portion of
U.S. publicly listed companies.
SOX's three primary changes to the U.S. federal corporate governance
regime were to increase objective monitoring of managers by outsiders, to
increase the emphasis on financial control, and to heighten civil and
criminal penalties for violations of the federal securities laws. The
legislation requires each director on the board's audit committee to be
independent. 3 6 The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and NASDAQ
listing standards, passed in response to SOX and a request by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC),' 37 also require a majority of a
134. The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act are codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (2000) and at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000), respectively.
135. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar et al., Sarbanes-Oxley's Effects on Small Firms: What is the
Evidence? 27 (Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and
Business, Working Paper No. 588, 2007) ("[Tlhe evidence offers qualified support for the
view that SOX had a negative effect on the value of small firms, at least initially.").
136. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(A) (2002). An
inside/non-independent director is typically a member of the corporation's senior
management, and may own company stock and stock options as incentive compensation.
By contrast, under SOX and the exchanges' listing standards, an independent director is not
a member of management (or otherwise employed by the corporation) and, other than
receiving a fee for serving as a director, has no financial ties to the corporation (e.g., as a
consultant or through greater than 10 percent stock ownership, or familial ties to
executives). See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J.
CoRPt. L. 73, 84-94 (2007) (discussing the general characteristics of a director on the board).
An outside director is not a corporate employee, but may otherwise be tied to the
corporation through financial or personal ties. Id. at 99 (stating that an outside director is
"any director who is not a company employee, without regard to whether she meets a
standard of independence") (internal citation omitted). Independent and outside directors
typically do not work for the company full-time.
137. SEC Press Release, Pitt Seeks Review of Corporate Governance, Conduct Codes,
Feb. 13, 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-23.txt ("As part of an
ongoing effort to bolster investor confidence, Chairman Harvey L. Pitt of the Securities and
Exchange Commission has asked the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq to review
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company's board to be independent (the NYSE in particular requires
wholly independent nominating/governance and compensation
committees). 38  Under SOX, the audit committee must also include a
financial expert.'39 SOX also seeks to improve monitoring of management
by prohibiting external auditors from providing any non-audit services to
issuers, requiring auditors to rotate every five years, and requiring attorneys
to report any violations of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty up the
corporate hierarchy to in-house attorneys, the CEO, and ultimately the
audit committee. '40
SOX Section 404 ("Section 404") requires management to maintain,
evaluate, and report on internal control over financial reporting.14' Internal
controls are meant to provide reasonable assurance that financial reporting
and preparation of financial statements are reliable for investors and in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP").
142
Management must produce an annual report about the company's internal
control that evaluates its effectiveness and discloses any material
weaknesses. 143 Under Section 404, a material weakness in internal control
must be reported when there is "a reasonable possibility" that a material
financial misstatement "will not be prevented or detected on a timely
corporate governance and listing standards, including the important issues of officer and
director qualifications ....").
138. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A(1)-A(2) (2002) (requiring majority
board independence); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A(4)-(6), A(7)(c)
(requiring independent audit, nominating/corporate governance and compensation
committees); NASDAQ, Inc., Manual § 4350(c)(1) (2006).
139. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2002).
140. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a) (2002) (prohibiting
the provision of non-audit services by an auditor); The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 203,
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2002) (prohibiting a registered public accounting firm from providing
audit services if the lead auditor partner provided audit services in each of the five previous
years); The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002) (requiring
corporate attorneys to report evidence of a violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary
duty to the head in-house counsel or CEO and, if the response is inappropriate, to report to
the audit committee, to another committee comprised solely of independent directors, or to
the board as a whole).
141. 13 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002).
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f) (2007); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15(f) (2007). "Reasonable
assurance" does not require perfection in financial reporting: internal control procedures are
not expected to "prevent or detect all misstatements, whether unintentional errors or fraud."
71 Fed. Reg. 77,636, 77,639 (December 27, 2006).
143. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262; 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.308(a)(1)-(3) (2007). Section 404 and the SEC's corresponding regulations make
management responsible for providing GAAP-compliant control assessments. Scott A.
Taub, Deputy Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Address at SEC and Financial
Reporting Conference, The SEC's Internal Control Report Rules and Thoughts on the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (May 29, 2003) ("What is new in these [SOX implementing] rules, as
far as management's responsibilities, is the requirement to evaluate the effectiveness of
those controls and provide a report on that evaluation.").
2008]
984 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Voi. 10:4
basis." 144 Reporting a material weakness in control does not mean that a
financial misstatement was made or is likely to be made, but it may be an
indication of lower quality financial reporting. 1
45
On a quarterly basis, management must also disclose any material
changes to the internal control system. 46 Section 302 of SOX requires that
the CEO and chief financial officer (CFO) annually certify the truth of the
company's financial and non-financial disclosures, affirm their
responsibility for maintaining internal control, publicly disclose any
significant changes in internal controls, and internally disclose to auditors
and the audit committee any weaknesses in the control system. 47 A public
company's annual report must also include a statement that an outside
auditor reviewed (attested to) management's internal control assessment, 48
and provide the auditor's attestation report. 49  SOX also established the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a quasi-public entity
charged with promulgating new auditing standards and monitoring and
disciplining external auditors. 50 Finally, SOX increased penalties for
violations of the federal securities laws, including increased criminal
liability for false certifications and other types of fraud,'' and allows the
144. 17 C.F.R. 210.1-02 (2007).
145. See Kam C. Chan et al., Earnings Management of Firms Reporting Material
Internal Control Weaknesses Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, AUDITING: J.
PRACTICE THEORY (forthcoming) (finding some evidence of more earnings management
among firms that report internal control weaknesses), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078522; Jeffery Doyle et al., Accruals Quality and Internal
Control over Financial Reporting, 82 ACCT. REv. 1141 (2007).
146. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(d) (2007); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15(d) (2007); 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.308(c) (2007).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2002); see also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78dd-3 (2002) (first U.S. statutory provision requiring companies to
maintain internal control).
148. 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(a)(4) (2007).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(b) (2007). Registered public accounting firms auditing a
public company's financial statements are required to "attest to, and report upon"
management's assessment of internal control. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(f) (2005). An auditor's
attestation must be made in accordance with standards issued or adopted by the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board. Management's Report on Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68
Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,637 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. parts 210, 228, 229,
240, 240, 270 and 274).
150. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2002).
151. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 807(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2002) (requiring
increased penalties for defrauding shareholders or publicly held companies); The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 903, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002) (requiring increased penalties for mail
and wire fraud); The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2002)
(requiring criminal liability for false certifications); The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §
1106, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2002) (requiring increased penalties for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act).
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SEC to bar those it deems "unfit" to serve as directors and officers. 152
A. SOX and Agency Costs
By increasing outside monitoring and the emphasis on financial
control, SOX aims to reduce agency costs from opportunism relating to
management's involvement with financial reporting.'53 In response to
SOX, some firms may have improved the quality of their financial
statements. 54 In addition, SOX compliance may be able to facilitate some
aspects of innovation. SOX had the effect of requiring many companies to
change their information technology capabilities, which may have the
consequence of increasing the communication of innovation-relevant
knowledge within a company.'55 Nonetheless, because SOX mandates that
all public companies increase outside monitoring and financial control, and
the law's other related consequences, SOX likely has the more widespread
and significant effect of reducing some companies' ability to engage in
proximate monitoring to facilitate innovation.
This effect is important because, in addition to the general
considerations regarding management's tendency to not take on as much
risk as is optimal for investors, there is reason to believe that the costs of
myopia are significant. In a study based upon a broad cross-section of
public corporations, Aggarwal and Samwick found that increasing
managerial incentives through equity ownership did not increase
managerial opportunism, but rather increased investments and improved
performance for all levels of stock-based compensation. 56 They use this
finding to support the proposition that the principal source of agency costs
in public companies is managers failing to expend enough effort to, for
152. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 305(a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2002).
153. See Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279,
282-83 (2004) (noting that SOX "tries to ensure that agency costs and corporate fraud do
not again run rampant by requiring more watchers and stiffer penalties").
154. See generally Doyle et al., supra note 145; Kam C. Chan et al., Earnings
Management of Firms Reporting Material Internal Control Weaknesses Under Section 404
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, AUDITING: A JOURNAL OF PRACTICE & THEORY, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1078522; Jian Zhou, Financial
Reporting After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Conservative or Less Earnings Management?, 20
RES. ACCT. REGULATIONS (2007).
155. See Computer Associates, A Key Ingredient for Compliance: Automation 2 (Jan.
2006) (arguing that SOX "presents an opportunity to re-engineer and improve existing
financial business processes, enhancing information sharing and integrity"); Philipp
Koellinger, Why IT Matters-An Empirical Study of E-business Usage, Innovation, and
Firm Performance, DIW Berlin Discussion Papers 495 (2005), available at
http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/43300/dp495.pdf (arguing that successfully
implementing information technology increases innovation).
156. See Aggarwal & Samwick, supra note 128, at 491 (reviewing theories of agency
costs from empire building).
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example, start new product lines.'57 Aggarwal and Samwick's finding
strongly suggests that increasing objective monitoring to reduce managerial
opportunism is unlikely to make shareholders in a significant portion of
public companies better off. Accordingly, to the extent myopia is the result
of failing to expend additional effort towards long-term activities, reducing
myopia is a more important governance objective than reducing
opportunism.
Prior to SOX, companies whose investors would benefit from
relatively higher outside monitoring and more emphasis on financial
control likely had already adopted such structures. 15 8 Yet SOX requires all
companies to increase objective monitoring (i.e., more independent
directors and increased emphasis on internal control over financial
reporting), including companies for whom the optimal governance structure
involves relatively more proximate monitoring (i.e., decentralization and
strategic control). Because companies generally adopt the structures that
maximize value to shareholders, it is unlikely that SOX's mandatory
governance structures, which attempt to reduce opportunism, would make
investors in such companies better off. "9 To the contrary, the evidence
described in this Article suggests that the cumulative impact of SOX is to
tip the scales in innovative firms toward too much-and hence value-
reducing--objective monitoring.
The remainder of this Article uses the framework developed in Parts I
and II to analyze the impact of SOX (and the related exchange regulations)
on innovation. In discussing the empirical literature, common measures of
innovation, such as patent activity and R&D spending, are utilized as
proxies. 60 However, such indicators are imperfect measures of innovation.
Not all innovations are patentable and only a small proportion of patents
ultimately lead to successfully commercialized products.' 6 ' Furthermore,
R&D spending is merely an input into the innovation process. As such, it
does not guarantee innovation will occur and is not required for all
157. See id. at 490, 514 (concluding that their research finds no support for the general
theory that managers act opportunistically, (the "private benefits model"), but finding
support "for the idea that managers underinvest").
158. See Aggarwal & Williamson, supra note 94, at 23-24 (finding that prior to SOX
share prices were already higher for firms voluntarily adopting governance structures
similar to those mandated by SOX). This implies that prior to SOX, diversified investors
were generally bearing the optimal amount of agency costs from opportunism. See HENRY
N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE'VE
LEARNED; HOW TO Fix IT 23 (2006) (explaining that there is an optimal amount of fraud
relative to maximizing shareholder value).
159. See Chidambaran et al., supra note 2, at 32-33 (finding that firms adopting "good"
governance structures did not improve their performance).
160. Keith Smith, Measuring Innovation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION,
supra note 8, at 152.
161. Jaruzelski et al., supra note 10, at 52-53.
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innovations. 162  As previously noted, R&D spending may even reflect
managerial entrenchment and other types of value-destroying activity.
163
Nevertheless, the impact of SOX on patent activity and R&D spending is
important because such activities are reflective of the long-term risky
undertakings characteristic of corporate innovation. Empirical research
that uses these variables likely illustrates the more general impact of SOX
on innovation.
B. Assessment and Certification of Internal Control
Management's new SOX-mandated duties to assess and report on
internal control over financial reporting likely decrease their propensity to
engage in innovation or related activities. Three interrelated grounds
provide support for this conclusion.
1. Increased Emphasis on Financial Controls
SOX's increased disclosure requirements relating to internal control
tend to undermine a long-term, innovation orientation. The very purpose of
Section 404 is to improve the accuracy of numerical financial statements
under GAAP.64 Furthermore, in part due to SOX's requirement that audit
committees be composed of one financial expert, the proportion of
directors qualified as financial experts (e.g., CFOs, accountants) went from
ten percent in 1998 to twenty-one percent by 2004.165 Management's duty
to evaluate and report on the effectiveness of internal controls under
Section 404, and the presence of more financial experts on boards, is likely
to increase companies' emphasis on financial versus strategic control.
Under SOX, short-term financial reporting takes on a new level of
significance. 1
66
162. Peggy M. Lee, A Comparison of Ownership Structure and Innovations of US and
Japanese Firms, 26 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 39, 40 (2005) ("Not all R&D is
productive, and increased R&D does not necessarily translate to increased innovations.")
(citations omitted).
163. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
164. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 71 Fed. Reg.
77,635, 77,641 (Dec. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. parts 210, 240 and 241)
("Management should assess whether its controls are designed to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles .... ).
165. James S. Linck et al., The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors 30-31 (Feb. 4, 2008) (unpublished
research paper, on file with University of Georgia Terry School of Business), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=902665.
166. See Peter J. Wallison, Arthur F. Bums Fellow in Fin. Market Studies, Am. Enter.
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In addition, innovation involves the use of intangible knowledge
assets, including activities such as R&D, intellectual property rights, and
organizational advantages. 167  However, financial reporting under GAAP
may not adequately reflect knowledge assets. 168 For example, R&D
spending is expensed under GAAP, but changes in R&D productivity are
not reported in financial statements, so merely being GAAP-compliant
does not keep shareholders informed about changes in the value of R&D
investments. 169 To the extent SOX increases investor attention to GAAP-
compliant financial statements, it thus increases informational asymmetries
between managers and those who monitor them, thereby increasing the
potential for opportunism. To compensate for increased informational
asymmetries due to SOX's emphasis on GAAP, corporations may adopt
structures that reduce innovative activity. For example, while increasing
objective monitoring may undermine a company's ability to innovate, 7 0 an
innovative corporation reliant upon intangibles, and required by SOX to
increase its emphasis on GAAP-compliant financial statements, may
nonetheless increase the independence of its board to offset the increase in
informational asymmetries resulting from SOX. While such a change may
decrease opportunism, it would likely also decrease a company's
innovation activities. In this way, SOX's emphasis on financial reporting
under GAAP has a particularly negative impact on innovation activities
utilizing intangible assets.
Empirical studies generally support the proposition that SOX's
additional emphasis on financial control decreases innovation activities for
all public companies, regardless of size. '' Hitt et al. find a positive
relationship between an emphasis on strategic control and R&D, and a
negative relationship between emphasizing financial controls and R&D.'
Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Address at American Enterprise Institute Event on Audited
Earnings, Poor Diagnosis, Poor Prescription: The Error at the Heart of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (Jan. 23, 2003) (noting that SOX's "principal effect was to enshrine the audited
financial statement-prepared under [GAAP]-including a balance sheet, income statement
and statement of cash flow, as the central financial disclosure of companies whose shares
are traded in the public securities markets").
167. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Measuring and Representing the Knowledge
Economy: Accounting for Economic Reality Under the Intangibles Paradigm, 54 BUFF. L.
REv. 1, 10-11 (2006) (defining intangibles); supra Part I.A.
168. See Arewa, supra note 167, at 45 ("As a result of the intangibles paradigm shift,
financial statements have become less informative [to shareholders] from an accounting and
economic perspective."); Wallison, supra note 166 (noting that "GAAP financial statements
are inherently unable to produce accurate measures of assets and earnings for companies
that rely on intangible assets").
169. Aboody & Lev, supra note 127, at 2750.
170. See infra Part III.C.
171. Studies suggesting that SOX already decreased innovation activities are discussed
in the next section.
172. Hitt et al., supra note 115, at 1095-96, 1109.
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Other empirical studies have found similar results, and none have found the
contrary. 73  In a study of Chinese firms, Xinmin et al. found that while
strategic control facilitates radical innovation, it undermines incremental
innovations. 74  This finding is consistent with the proposition that
substantial innovations tend to be long-term in nature, whereas smaller,
incremental innovations can be completed on a short-term and more
readily-verifiable basis. Overall, the positive correlation between strategic
control and R&D suggests that decision making based on in-depth
operational knowledge is in some ways more important for innovation than
quantitative information or data from financial control. Operational
knowledge increases in importance in dynamic environments where
success depends upon bearing risks that are not subject to straightforward
quantification.' 75  SOX's emphasis on financial control thus likely
undermines innovation in firms that, prior to the law, relied more heavily
on strategic control to reduce the costs of myopic decision-making.
2. Financial Reporting Risk and Innovative Risk-Taking
The likely negative impact upon innovation from increasing an
emphasis on financial controls is compounded by an underlying tension
between management's duty to perform a risk-based assessment of internal
control under Section 404 and management's undertaking of risky
innovation activities. 176  SOX seems to have increased the likelihood of
having to disclose an internal control weakness when undertaking
innovation. Accordingly, because disclosure of a material weakness in
control may increase a company's cost of capital and decrease the price of
its stock even when no financial misstatements occur, 177 SOX may have
made managers more reluctant to engage in innovation activities solely to
avoid having to disclose a weakness in internal control.
The SEC's guidance regarding management's assessment of internal
control under SOX states that management should employ a "top-down,
173. Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 11.
174. Liu Xinmin et al., The Impact of a Firm 's Internal Control Mechanisms on the
Choice of Innovation Mode, I FRONTIERS Bus. RES. CHINA 91, 99-100 (2007).
175. See Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 12.
176. This tension is reflected in a post-SOX director survey which found a tension
between directors' increased risk-management role under SOX and management's risk-
taking role. ERNST & YOUNG, BOARD MEMBERS ON RISK: LEVERAGING FRAMEWORKS FOR
THE FUTURE 11 (2006).
177. See Jaqueline S. Hammersley et al., Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal
Control Weaknesses and to the Characteristics of those Weaknesses under Section 302 of
the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 13 REv. ACcT. STUD. 141, 144-45 (2007); Hollis
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost
of Equity 4-6 (Feb. 2007) (unpublished research paper), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=896760.
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risk-based" approach. 78  This means that management must identify the
risks of inaccurately reporting financial statements, design internal controls
to adequately prevent or detect financial misstatements, and gather more
evidence and perform more extensive testing in areas deemed to have more
financial reporting risk.7 9 The SEC identifies several characteristics of
transactions and their controls that increase the risk of financial
misstatement. These characteristics include transactions involving higher
agency costs (e.g., where controls are more susceptible to being overridden
by management'), high-risk transactions susceptible to substantial
economic loss, controls requiring substantial subjective judgment or
accounting complexity to be properly implemented, interdependent
controls, and transactions subject to economic and technological change.'
In addition, a SOX compliance guide notes that a common source of
material weakness in internal controls is "[i]nadequate controls associated
with the recording of nonroutine, complex, and unusual transactions."'8 2
178. Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Report on Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
72 Fed. Reg. 35,324, 35,324 (June 27, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. part 241)
[hereinafter SEC Guidance] (promulgating interpretative guidance which "sets forth an
approach by which management can conduct a top-down, risk-based evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting"). Although the SEC's guidance is technically not the
exclusive way to evaluate internal control, it is at least broadly indicative of what the SEC
considers to be the types of transaction characteristics contributing to the risk of financial
misstatement, and it is very likely to be relied upon by attorneys, judges, and companies in
determining the contours of legal risk. See Amendments to Rules Regarding Management's
Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,310, 35,310 (June 27,
2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. parts 210, 228, 229 and 240) (noting that the SEC's
proposed guidance is one of many ways to conduct an evaluation of internal control).
Furthermore, the SEC's top-down risk-based approach is not entirely new. At least a decade
before SOX, the importance of evaluating the risk of financial misstatement was widely
recognized. See COMMITTEE ON SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY
COMMISSION, INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (2004) [hereinafter COSO];
MICHAEL RAMOS, HOW TO COMPLY WITH SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404: ASSESSING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNAL CONTROL 49 (2d ed. 2006) (recognizing that the 1992 COSO
framework identifies new products, new activities, and the integration of new technology as
factors that increase financial reporting risk). COSO is a private-sector body made up of
several major executive and accounting related professional organizations that publish
guidance on internal control and other related financial reporting matters. The SEC
considers the COSO control framework to be suitable for management's assessment under
Section 404. See SEC Guidance at 3 n. 10 (providing a history on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
relation to section 404).
179. SEC Guidance, supra note 178, at 35,325, 35,327, 35,331.
180. For a summary of the issues involved with so-called "management override," see
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, MANAGEMENT OVERRIDE OF
INTERNAL CONTROLS: THE ACHILLES' HEEL OF FRAUD PREVENTION (2005).
181. SEC Guidance, supra note 178, at 35,330, 35,335.
182. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-OXLEY:
UNDERSTANDING How SARBANES-OXLEY AFFECTS YOUR BUSINESS 219 (2007).
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Guidance by a leading audit firm also finds that firms must avoid
capitalizing intangible assets before a new product is technologically
feasible. "3
Under SOX's specific top-down, risk-based approach, management's
assessment of internal control under SOX must place a special emphasis on
innovation activities. Because innovation requires management to have
substantial discretion to focus on long-term activities not easily measured
in the short term, it necessarily involves transactions where managers can
potentially manipulate financial data and act opportunistically at the
expense of shareholders. Innovation and entrepreneurship also tend to be
higher risk activities that rely upon manager's subjective judgment
regarding the potential value of hard-to-quantify assets and opportunities.
Accordingly, subjective judgment may be required to properly implement
controls for such transactions. Furthermore, because many of the activities
involved in innovation are interdependent and organization-wide, changing
controls over one activity may impact controls over another activity.
Innovation activities may also involve non-routine and unusual
transactions. Finally, properly accounting for innovation activities
inherently creates the risk of capitalizing on the value of intangible assets
(i.e., ideas) before a new product is commercially feasible.
Innovation and related activities thus possess the same characteristics
identified by the SEC and others as contributing to the risk of financial
misstatements. Studies of post-SOX disclosures of internal control
weaknesses found more frequent disclosures of control weaknesses in
companies operating in either dynamic business environments or
undergoing rapid growth and internal change. 8 4  Because innovation
activities are more likely to be found in companies subject to change or
undergoing organizational change," 5  these studies provide indirect
empirical support that innovation activities tend to be a source of higher
reporting risk than more routine, non-innovation activities. In addition, a
survey by Financial Executives International found that public companies
with a decentralized operational structure experienced over twice the
internal control compliance costs (four million dollars) as those with
183. ERNST & YOUNG, EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNAL CONTROLS: FOURTH SURVEY AND
INDUSTRY INSIGHTS 126 (2005).
184. Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., The Discovery and Reporting of Internal Control
Deficiencies Prior to SOX-Mandated Audits, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 166, 190 (2007) (finding
relatively more internal control weaknesses among firms that are faster growing, have more
operating segments and foreign transactions, and engaging in mergers and acquisitions and
restructurings); Jeffrey Doyle et al., Determinants of Weaknesses in Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 193, 220 (2007) (finding more disclosures of
material weaknesses in internal control from firms with more operating segments, engaging
in foreign currency translation, and that are smaller and younger).
185. See supra Parts I.B and I.D.
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centralized operations. 8 6  Because innovative companies tend to have
relatively decentralized operations, this study supports the related
proposition that SOX places a relatively higher internal control burden on
such firms. Finally, a case-study of small and medium sized companies
required to comply with SOX revealed that delays in internal control
assessments became more pronounced as transaction complexity
increased.187 This finding is consistent with the proposition that, because
innovation-related transactions tend to be more complex from a control or
accounting perspective, innovation transactions and controls are a more
costly aspect of the SOX-mandated internal control assessment process.
Because innovation activities are a relatively higher source of
financial reporting risk, they are also likely a more costly component of
management implementing and maintaining a control system that provides
reasonable assurance of financial statement accuracy under Section 404.
Innovation-related controls may generally require more extensive
documentation and testing under a top-down, risk-based approach. All
things being equal, management is less likely to engage in innovation post-
SOX because doing so increases the risk of having to report a material
weakness in internal control even where financial statements are not
actually compromised. 188 A guide that advises how to comply with SOX's
internal control requirements suggests that one straightforward way to
reduce financial reporting risk is to "choos[e] to not undertake the activity
that gives rise to the risk."' 89 The post-SOX empirical record thus far is
consistent with such advice.
A study by Bargeron et al. compared the differences between 2,290
public corporations in the U.S. and U.K. (which do not have to comply
with SOX) before and after SOX regulation became effective (from 1994
through 2006).'90 Post-SOX, the authors found that R&D spending for
U.S. companies decreased while R&D spending increased for U.K.
firms.' 9' The authors also found that, in contrast to U.K. firms, after SOX,
U.S. firms in R&D intense industries were less likely to go public and may
186. FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INTERNATIONAL, FEI SURVEY ON SARBANES-OXLEY
SECTION 404 IMPLEMENTATION 8, 17 (2007).
187. Vicky Arnold et al., The Unintended Consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley on
Technology Innovation and Supply Chain Integration, 4 J. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ACCT.
103, 117 (2007).
188. Another effect of this result may be to increase the cost of raising and borrowing
capital for innovative public companies. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 158, at 47
(arguing that SOX may reduce the flow of resources to firms engaging in "novel business
practices" because such firms are "subject to increased liability risk under SOX").
189. RAMOS, supra note 178, at 48 (emphasis in original).
190. Leonce Bargeron et al., Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-Taking (Mar. 6, 2008)
(unpublished research paper, Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract = 104063.
191. Id. at 15.
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have decreased their risk-taking overall. 92 Similarly, Cohen et al. found a
significant post-SOX decline in R&D spending. 93 In addition, a study by
Kang and Liu analyzed the impact of SOX on managerial risk-taking by
using a "hurdle rate," which is the minimum rate of return a manager
would require before deciding to invest in a project. '94 The authors found a
significant increase in the hurdle rate after the implementation of SOX and
attributed the increase to managers becoming more cautious in their
investment decisions.195 This finding can also be explained by
management's attempt to avoid risky innovation activities that create a
relatively greater risk of having to disclose an internal control weakness.
3. Organizational Flexibility
Compliance with SOX's internal control duties may reduce
organizational flexibility within corporations and thereby undermine
innovation through strategic renewal or other attempts to adapt to
change. 196 Findings from the SEC's own Advisory Committee on Smaller
Public Companies (Advisory Committee) support this conclusion. The
Advisory Committee found that SOX undermined flexibility in small
companies based on two observations. First, smaller companies are
dynamic and constantly evolving, requiring frequent changes in production
processes and job duties within the company. '9' This dynamism limits the
ability of small companies to have well-documented production processes
as required by SOX because "[f]lexibility and quick change often means
that processes and [internal] controls change, and consequently that the
documentation of those controls change" quickly as well.' 98 Second, in
smaller companies decision makers "wear multiple hats."' 99 Duties are not
clearly segregated between undertaking business projects and financial
reporting. As a result, top managers responsible for operations are also
192. Id. at 21-23.
193. Daniel A. Cohen et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for
Compensation Contracts and Managerial Risk-Taking 19, 22 (Nov. 2007) (unpublished
research paper, on file with New York University Stem School of Business), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-568483.
194. Qiang Kang & Qiao Liu, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Managerial Risk Taking: A
Structural Assessment 4 (March 1, 2007) (unpublished research paper, on file with the
University of Miami), available at http://papers.ssm.cornsol3/papers.cfn?
abstractid=967950.
195. Id. at 15.
196. SOX's independent director requirements may also undermine flexibility. See infra
Part III.C.
197. ADVISORY COMM. ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
FINAL REPORT 36 (2006).
198. Id. at 38.
199. Id. at 35.
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involved in financial reporting.200 This combination of constantly changing
control processes and management's involvement in documenting those
changes, means that SOX's additional financial reporting duties divert
operational assets to documenting and reporting changes in internal
processes, thereby increasing the cost of such changes. Accordingly, the
Advisory Committee concluded that SOX compliance causes dynamic
companies that utilize top management in the financial reporting process to
lose flexibility.2 '
While the Advisory Committee limited its findings to small public
companies, it is also the case that large, innovative companies are dynamic
and therefore have management overlap in their operational and financial
reporting functions. First, large innovative companies dynamically adapt to
economic change by engaging in strategic renewal, changing their routines
to integrate new products and adopting radical process innovations. The
organizational changes arising from such activities implicate processes in
several different parts of a company and may result in a large corporation
changing previously established boundaries, controls, and production
processes.202
Second, even though large corporations segregate operational and
internal control functions, there is still significant overlap between top
management's operational duties and those duties related to financial
reporting. As the response by Apple described in the introduction to this
Article illustrates, innovation may require operational managers to interact
with those involved in financial reporting and accounting to properly
exercise judgment about how an innovation should be undertaken. When
organizational innovation or a substantial change in routines takes place,
under Section 404 management must assess the impact of such changes on
internal control and reporting risk.203 In addition, SOX requires
management to disclose on a quarterly basis any material changes to
internal control,2 4 which may include those that result from a large
company undergoing substantial organizational change or strategic
renewal. Furthermore, although SOX only mandates that the CEO and
CFO certify the reliability of the internal controls, this requirement has the
unintended consequence of requiring, on average, 22 additional executives
200. Id.
201. Id. at 36.
202. See Stieglitz & Heine, supra note 81, at 6 (noting that successfully implementing
substantial and radical innovations may require cutting across the traditional organizational
boundaries within the firm).
203. See RAMOS, supra note 178, at 49-50 (identifying new activities and restructurings
as conditions likely to increase financial reporting risk under Section 404).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(d) (2007); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15(d) (2007); 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.308(c) (2007).
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to sign internal control sub-certifications.0 5 A 2003 survey found that a
majority of all financial professionals provide information ultimately used
in their companies' publicly disclosed financial reports and that a third
were required to sign section 302 sub-certifications.2 6 Although most of
these financial professionals were already involved in financial reporting
(e.g., treasurers), a significant portion of those found to be newly required
to sign the sub-certifications were made up of operational directors,
managers, and company vice presidents.2 7  It is also highly likely that
subordinates to operational managers who are newly required to sign sub-
certifications have a role in supporting the sub-certifying manager in the
financial reporting process.
The dynamic nature of large innovative companies and management's
involvement in financial reporting thus indicate that SOX reduces
flexibility in large companies as it does in small public companies, through
perhaps to a lesser extent. Accordingly, SOX likely increases the cost of
strategic renewal, new product integration, and radical innovation by
increasing the involvement of managers and other employees, who are
otherwise tasked with running the company, in the financial reporting
aspects of the business. Consistent with the foregoing is a case study of
both small and medium-sized public companies finding that SOX
compliance substantially reduced organizational flexibility due to concerns
over having to report a material weakness in internal control.2 8
Furthermore, the studies finding internal control weaknesses more likely in
companies undergoing rapid change 20 9 are consistent with the proposition
that SOX increases the cost of such change and, accordingly, may
undermine the organizational and operational flexibility that facilitates
innovation.
In sum, Section 404 increases the emphasis on financial versus
strategic control, increases the cost of internal control assessments and
reporting risks associated with innovation activities, and hampers the
flexibility of even large public companies. The combined impact of these
effects likely reduces the innovation capability of public companies that,
but for SOX, would place a relatively greater emphasis on strategic control,
undertake more activities facilitating innovation, and adapt to change
through organizational innovation.
205. See Jo Lynne Koehn & Stephen C. DelVecchio, Revisiting the Ripple Effects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CPA J. ONLINE, May 2006, http://www.nysscpa.org/printversions/cpaj
/2006/506/p32.htm (reporting survey results showing that "22.5 executives, other than the
CEO and CFO, will be required to submit subcertifications").
206. Assoc. FOR FIN. PROFESSIONALS, SUBCERTIFICATION: FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS
TAKING THE LEAD ON SARBANES-OXLEY 2 (2003).
207. Id. at 2-4.
208. Arnold et al., supra note 187, at 21-25.
209. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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C. More Independent and Larger Boards
Prior to SOX, there was a trend towards smaller board size and greater
independence among public companies, due in part to shareholder activism
and public pressure. 210 Although SOX reversed the trend towards smaller
boards, it increased the trend towards greater board independence.
Before SOX was passed, about two-thirds of the directors on public
company boards were comprised of outside or independent directors, 21' and
seventy-five percent of all companies traded on the NYSE had a majority
of independent directors. 2  In 2000, 38.5 percent of 500 of the largest
U.S.-listed public companies (i.e., those on the S&P 500 index) did not
have fully independent audit committees as would later be mandated by
SOX. 21 3  In 2001, 10.2 percent of all public companies did not have a
majority of independent directors on their boards, 4 and neither did about
eleven percent of the S&P 500 in 2000, as would later be required by the
post-SOX NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards.21 5 Furthermore, high-
tech innovative companies were generally even less SOX compliant before
the law was passed. In 2000, "new economy" companies had a lower ratio
of independent directors and a slightly higher likelihood of having an
insider-dominated board than their "old economy" 
counterparts.
21 6
Subsequent to SOX, both the percentage of independent directors and
the percentage of public company boards with a majority of independent
directors increased. Linck et al. found that from 2001 to 2004, the
percentage of outside directors on boards increased from 66.3 to 70.8
percent, and that the percentage of boards with a majority of inside
directors decreased from 10.2 to 4.6 percent.
21 7 Although these changes
210. Linck et al., supra note 165, at 23.
211. Id. at 23 (finding that 66.3 percent of directors were outsiders in 2001); Vidhi
Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, The Transformation of U.S. Corporate Boards: 1997-
2003 36, tbl.1 panel A (May 2004) (unpublished research paper, on file with Cornell
University) (finding 64.04 percent of directors independent in 2000), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-556270.
212. Clarke, supra note 136, at 73 n.2.
213. Chhaochharia & Grinstein, supra note 211, at 39 tbl.1, panel E by size (showing
that in 2000 61.49 percent of S&P 500 companies had independent audit committees).
214. Linck et al., supra note 165, at 40, Fig. 1 panel B. Annual figures on file with
author.
215. Id. at 36, tbl.1, panel A (finding that in 2000 81.88 percent of public companies had
a majority of independent directors); id. at 36, tbl.1, panel B (finding that in 2000 89.79
percent of S&P 500 companies had a majority of independent directors). Another measure
of large public companies comes to similar results, finding that in 2000 insider-dominated
boards comprised 9 percent of companies having a median market capitalization of $2.07
billion. Linck et al., supra note 94, at 316-17.
216. Chhaochharia & Grinstein, supra note 211, at 37 tbl.1 panel C.
217. Linck et al., supra note 165, at 40 Fig. 1 panels A-B (annual data on file with
author); see also Chhaochharia & Grinstein, supra note 211, at 37, tbl. 1, panel C (finding
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were continuations of trends already in place prior to SOX, they also
became more pronounced after SOX and likely reflect specific efforts to
comply with the law. 218 To become SOX compliant, companies tended to
add independent directors rather than replace insiders, which is reflected in
public company board size increasing on average by 8.4 percent from 2001
to 2004 (which reversed the prior 12-year trend in decreasing board
size). 219 In absolute terms, the increase in board size post-SOX was not
substantial. Disaggregated by firm size, from 2001 to 2004 the average
number of directors for large, medium, and small public companies
increased from 9.3 to 10.3, 7.3 to 7.8, and 6.1 to 6.5, respectively.
220
SOX and related independent director requirements therefore
increased outside monitoring across all sizes of public companies, and was
at least in part responsible for about ten percent making a fundamental
switch from having a board with a majority of insiders to one with a
majority of outsiders. Losing a majority of inside directors, or adding just
one or two more independent directors, may significantly alter a company's
decision making with respect to innovation. As suggested by empirical
corporate governance research discussed below, innovation decisions are
sensitive to board composition and board size. Independent and inside
directors make different contributions to innovation, and the size of a board
has an impact on the nature of its decision making.
Independent directors can facilitate innovation by aligning incentives
of managers and shareholders, expanding the base of expertise from which
management can draw, enhancing objectivity in director decision making,
and encouraging managers to pursue corporate entrepreneurship.22'
However, because independent directors are not involved in day-to-day
operations and likely have little or no stock ownership interest in the
corporation, their capabilities and incentives to promote corporate
entrepreneurship are limited.222 By contrast, inside directors "are likely to
be better informed about the sources of uncertainty and the potential returns
stemming from innovative projects, and therefore they are more qualified
to promote and assess such undertakings.' ' 23 Inside directors are in a better
position to assess the merits of entrepreneurial projects because they are
involved in the strategy process and have working knowledge of the
that new economy companies increased their independent board representation from 2000 to
2003 from 62.13 percent to 67.01 percent, a 7.8 percent increase).
218. Linck et al., supra note 165, at 27-29.
219. Id. at24.
220. Linck et al., supra note 94, at 318 Fig. 1 panel C. Annual data on file with author.
221. Zahra, supra note 68, at 1717.
222. Id.
223. Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 20; see also Zahra, supra note 68, at 1718
(noting that corporate entrepreneurship requires making informed judgments in the face of
uncertainty).
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corporation.2 4  Inside directors also have greater abilities and more
incentives to increase communication and new product integration because
they are involved in the day-to-day decision making of the company.225
Inside directors, because they generally possess greater knowledge of
corporate operations and industry changes than outsiders, are likely in a
better position to facilitate strategic renewal.226 Organizational flexibility is
also generally facilitated when managers have substantial discretion to
pursue projects without being micromanaged or second-guessed by third
parties, 22' a phenomenon that may increase the more independent and
larger the board.
Accordingly, a board of directors which best facilitates innovation is
comprised of some optimal balance of independent and inside directors.
The relevant empirical evidence suggests that SOX, by increasing director
independence, upset the optimal balance in certain innovative public
221companies.
In a study of 1,526 publicly traded companies around the passage of
SOX, Wintoki examined returns around important SOX-related events and
found that the returns for companies with relatively higher monitoring
costs, as determined by factors including R&D spending and growth
opportunities, were abnormally low. 229 This finding was attributed to such
firms benefiting from having a significantly smaller proportion of
independent directors and SOX's director mandates undermining the
performance of such companies. 230  Wintoki's findings provide indirect
support for the proposition that SOX adversely impacted innovative firms
for which relatively less independent board members is the optimal
governance structure.
224. Zahra, supra note 68, at 1718; see also Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 20
("[linside directors, who actively participate in the operations of the company, are more and
better informed and, consequently, should be more competent in assessing the strategic
desirability of decisions and their potential consequences in the short or in the long run.").
225. See Lacetera, supra note 100, at 38 (arguing that inside directors enhance
innovation because they are directly and continuously involved with the company and also
noting that "granting insiders strategic decision power is said by most studies to be a
powerful incentive to share knowledge and competencies").
226. Zahra, supra note 68, at 1718; see also supra Part I.B.
227. See Lacetera, supra note 100, at 36; Lassen et al., supra note 12, at 368; Teece et
al., supra note 81, at 521 (noting that "decentralization and local autonomy" facilitate a
firm's ability to reconfigure in response to rapidly changing environments).
228. See also Linck et al., supra note 94, at 311 (noting prior research suggesting that "it
is not optimal for firms with high information asymmetry to invite monitoring from
independent directors because it is costly for the firms to transfer firm specific information
to outsiders").
229. M. Babajide Wintoki, Corporate Boards and Firm Value: The Effects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 2002 Exchange Listing Requirements, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 229,
243, 246-47 (2007).
230. Id. at 239, 243.
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Furthermore, empirical studies largely find a positive correlation
between the ratio of inside directors and innovation or related activity. In a
1996 survey-based study of 127 Fortune 500 corporations, Zahra found that
having more outside directors was negatively correlated with innovation
and strategic renewal.23' Other studies have also observed a correlation
between R&D spending and the presence of more insider directors.
Baysinger et al. found that the percentage of inside directors on a board
was positively correlated with R&D spending in a representative sample of
232Fortune 500 companies.
More recent studies, after the movement toward board independence,
also find a correlation between inside directors and factors which may be
proxies for innovation, and attribute this finding to the proposition that
firms efficiently adapt to higher monitoring costs by choosing more
insiders to serve as directors.233 Based upon a 1992 to 2001 sample of
8,165 observations of public companies, Coles et al. found some evidence
that R&D intensive companies have a greater representation of insiders on
their boards, reflecting their dependence upon firm-specific knowledge
possessed by inside directors.234 Using a sample of 6,931 public companies
observed from 1990 to 2004, Linck et al. also found that public companies
with higher monitoring costs had less independent boards.235 However,
Link et al. found that higher R&D spending was generally correlated with a
more independent board,236 as did Boone et al. based on their study of
2371,019 firms during their first 10 years after going public. Yet, when
isolating R&D intensive companies, Coles et al. found that firm value
increases with a greater proportion of inside directors. They estimated that
replacing one outside director with one insider on a ten-member board
increased shareholder wealth by $263 million in a sample of companies
231. Zahra, supra note 68, at 1725-32.
232. Barry D. Baysinger et al., Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on Corporate
R&D Strategy, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 205, 207-09 (1991); see also Charles W.L. Hill & Scott
A. Snell, External Control, Corporate Strategy, and Firm Performance in Research-
Intensive Industries, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 577, 588 (1988) (finding a significant positive
correlation between concentrated stock-ownership and R&D spending in 94 research-
intensive Fortune 500 companies).
233. Boone et al., supra note 95, at 70-71 (describing the "monitoring hypothesis" in the
context of reviewing empirical studies on board size, independence and firm
characteristics).
234. Jeffrey L. Coles et al., Boards: Does One Size Fit All?, 87 J. FIN. ECON 329, 346
(2008) (noting that their three-stage least squares regression results "indicate that high-R&D
firms have a higher insider fraction" on their boards).
235. Linck et al., supra note 94, at 320, 326.
236. Id.
237. See Boone et al., supra note 95, at 84-86, 90 (estimating that a "one-standard-
deviation increase in the R&D measure predicts a 1.9 percentage point increase in the
proportion of independent directors").
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with a median annual sales of $1.8 billion.238 These results on R&D
spending and board composition support the proposition, developed in Part
II.C, that a greater proportion of insiders facilitates valuable R&D in
innovative companies whereas, in non-innovative companies, R&D
spending may require greater outside monitoring to guard against
opportunism and optimize its value to the company.239
In addition, based on a sample of 81 public companies that continually
operated from 1935 to 2000, Lehn et al. found that independence was
negatively correlated to growth opportunities where firms operated in
markets with frequent technological change and rapidly changing prices.
240
Lehn et al. interpreted their finding as demonstrating that companies like
Genentech, which are heavily dependent upon knowledge utilization and
flexibility, benefit from the increased presence of insiders.241
Zahra found that stock ownership by outside directors contributes to
entrepreneurship, which is consistent with the proposition that giving
directors incentives to monitor and promote entrepreneurship will facilitate
that activity.242 However, Zahra noted that stock ownership by outside
directors can only go so far to facilitate innovation because "the lack of
access to information on corporate entrepreneurship may continue to
frustrate even those outside directors who own relatively large blocks of
corporate stock., 243  This finding underscores the importance of
knowledge-utilization for successful innovation. While stock ownership by
outside directors may increase incentives to be entrepreneurial, incentives
are no substitute for the superior knowledge possessed by inside directors.
By limiting the knowledge of the corporation's operations, director
independence may be a structural barrier to innovative activities and
decision-making.
Finally, innovative firms benefit from relatively smaller boards. One
reason for this is that the high cost of monitoring for innovation activities
238. Coles et al., supra note 234, at 344. Coles et al. found no relation between firm
value and R&D spending for low-R&D companies. Id.
239. For the potential of R&D spending to give rise to managerial opportunism, see
supra note 128 and accompanying text.
240. Kenneth Lehn et al., Determinants of the Size and Structure of Corporate Boards:
1935-2000 10-12, 18, 20-21, 25 (Sept. 2004) (unpublished research paper, on file with
University of Pittsburgh, Katz Graduate School of Business), available at
http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/5/5514/papers/ZHAO.pdf.
241. Id. at26.
242. Zahra, supra note 68, at 1728; see also Munari & Sobrero, supra note 10, at 21
(stating that Zahra's study indicates that insiders control is more conducive to innovation).
In a study of Asian firms, Hung and Mondejar also found that a preference for innovative
risk-taking was positively correlated with share ownership by directors. Humphry Hung &
Reuben Mondejar, Corporate Directors and Entrepreneurial Innovation: An Empirical
Study, 14 J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 117, 125 (2005).
243. Zahra, supra note 68, at 1729.
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rises in proportion to board size. 2" Management scholars find that larger
groups suffer from communication and coordination problems.2 45 These
deficiencies may be particularly acute for innovation activities that rely
upon communication of knowledge and coordination of interdependent
activities. Supporting this proposition are studies by Boone et al. and
Cheng which found that board size is negatively correlated with R&D
expenditures across a broad range of public companies,246 and a study by
Linck et al. finding that public companies with high monitoring and
advising costs-characteristics typical of innovative companies-have
smaller boards.2 47 Importantly, no studies have found that R&D intensity,
high monitoring costs, or any other proxy for innovation correlates with
larger boards.
In sum, the empirical corporate governance literature suggests that a
significant number of innovative public companies maximize their value to
shareholders with relatively less independent and smaller boards.
Innovation activities have higher monitoring costs, and the studies finding
that firms with higher monitoring costs tend to have more inside directors
and smaller boards are consistent with the proposition that innovation is
facilitated by proximate, inside monitoring. To the extent SOX increased
the independence and size of innovative companies' boards beyond their
optimal levels, SOX may have undermined the ability and propensity of
such companies to innovate.
D. Increased Director and Manager Turnover
Maintaining a commitment to long-term investment projects suggests
that there is an optimal level of decision maker tenure and turnover. On the
one hand, long-term commitments will likely be undermined if strategic
decision makers leave the corporation before projects are completed.
Successful innovation requires the development of firm-specific knowledge
and skills over a substantial period of time; this implies that innovation
may be lower in corporations where either short tenure or excessive
turnover (or possibly both) undermine and interfere with the long-term
commitments and planning required for innovation. Because successful
innovation often requires quick execution,2 48 innovation is less likely to
succeed where high turnover leads a company to delay implementing an
244. Linck et al., supra note 94, at 311.
245. Linck et al., supra note 165, at 24.
246. Boone et al., supra note 95, at 69 (estimating that "a one-standard-deviation
increase in either R&D intensity or return variance predicts a decrease in board size by 0.25
members"); Shijun Cheng, Board Size and the Variability of Corporate Performance, 87 J.
FIN. ECON. 157, 163 (2008).
247. Linck et al., supra note 94, at 320, 326.
248. See Andrew et al., supra note 31, at 17-19.
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innovation project until a new manager is integrated into the company. On
the other hand, directors and managers insulated from the market for
corporate control, or otherwise able to secure excessive tenure, may be less
reluctant to innovate, thus resulting in organizational inertia.240
Empirical research demonstrates that the post-SOX increase in
burdens and liabilities has substantially increased turnover among key
corporate personnel. Post-SOX, there has been a significant increase in
turnover among CEOs, CFOs, and directors (although turnover rates may
be decreasing and not all increases are attributable to SOX).2 50 Although
few empirical studies measure the relationship between director or
management turnover and innovation, the research generally suggests that
the higher, SOX-induced turnover rates are not optimal for innovation. A
study of post-IPO high-tech medical instrument corporations by Yasemin
Kor provides mixed but suggestive results. Kor found that R&D spending
decreased as top manager's tenure increased, indicating that newer
managers had incentives to take higher risks than the more established,
senior managers. 21  This may indicate that SOX increases innovation
insofar as it has the effect of bringing in new managers willing to take on
more R&D spending or other risky activities. However, Kor also found
that R&D spending was correlated to shared, team-specific, experience by
managers, suggesting that risky R&D investments flourish in conditions
where there is shared understanding and trust.252 Thus, innovation may be
undermined by bringing in new managers because shared understanding
and trust take time to establish. Kor also found an association between
lower R&D spending and more outsiders on boards and longer
249. See, e.g., Shelley S. Gordon et al., Convergence Versus Strategic Reorientation:
The Antecedents of Fast-Paced Organizational Change, 26 J. MGMT. 911, 915, 918 (2000).
250. See RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES, FINANCIAL OFFICERS' TURNOVER: 2007
STUDY 1 (noting that after SOX, CFO, controller and treasurer "turnover has increased
dramatically"); Dan R. Dalton & Catherine M. Dalton, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Guidelines
of the Listing Exchanges: What Have We Wrought?, 50 Bus. HORIZONS 93, 95-96 (2007)
(discussing turnover and instability with boards of directors and CEOs); Telis Demos,
Doesn't Anyone Want to Be a CFO Anymore?, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 22, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/01/22/magazines/fortune/CFO-nopain.fortune/index.htm
(reporting that public "[c]ompanies with a market cap of at least $1 billion changed CFOs
three times more often in 2005 than in 2002" and that "among public companies of all sizes,
CFO exits increased from 1,867 in 2005 to 2,302 in 2006."); see also DELOITTE, How CFOS
CAN THRIVE UNDER THE PRESSURE (2008) (recognizing the increased demands placed on
CFOs); Linck et al., supra note 165, at 29-30 (discussing the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act on directors and boards and the associated risks and workloads).
251. Yasemin Y. Kor, Direct and Interaction Effects of Top Management Team and
Board Compositions on R&D Investment Strategy, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1081, 1089,
1093 (2006) (exploring the varying compositions of board outsiders and top management
teams and how those different combinations effect the intensity of R&D investment).
252. Id. at 1089, 1093.
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management tenure. 253  Kor interpreted this finding as evidence that
outsider boards bring gamesmanship and conflict into a corporation, which
has the effect of reducing R&D spending.254 This finding also supports the
proposition that corporations that rely on proximate inside monitors are
better equipped to steer investment projects toward risky innovation
projects than corporations that rely on outside monitors.
In addition, some studies have reviewed the impact of tenure or
turnover on changes in strategic reorientation, which may be a proxy for
innovation insofar as new products, methods, or forms of organization
result from changes in strategy. A study by Wiersema and Bentel found
that longer tenure by top management, including the CEO, was correlated
with more changes in strategy,2 55 and Gordon et al. found that companies
with higher turnover of top managers (excluding the CEO) were less likely
to modify strategy.256 These findings suggest that top managers must first
gain substantial knowledge of the company before implementing strategic
changes and that the post-SOX increase in turnover undermines this
process to the detriment of innovation. However, Gordon et al. also found
that companies that changed CEOs were more likely to alter their strategic
orientation. 257  This may show that SOX increased changes in strategic
reorientation, which facilitated innovation. However, to the extent SOX
changed strategic orientation, it is more likely that SOX caused companies
to hire new CEOs with a strategy that promoted a relatively greater focus
on risk management and legal compliance as opposed to innovation. This
latter interpretation is suggested in the next subsection.
E. Changing Roles of Directors and Officers
Directors and top-level managers are responsible for engaging in
innovation-supporting activities like strategic entrepreneurship. This
includes strategic monitoring, where directors evaluate management and
top-level managers evaluate subordinates. Generally, the allocation of
company time to established projects or routines occurs at the expense of
time that could have been devoted to innovation.258 Moreover, individuals
259possess limited attention spans that they can devote to innovation.
253. Id. at 1091, 1094.
254. Id. at 1087-88.
255. Margarethe F. Wiersema & Karen A. Bantel, Top Management Team Demography
and Corporate Strategic Change, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 91, 113 (1992).
256. See Gordon et al., supra note 249, at 933.
257. See id.
258. See Stieglitz & Heine, supra note 81, at 7 (suggesting that there is "a fundamental
trade-off between the creation and use of assets ... because the creation of new assets gets
in the way of an efficient use of existing resources").
259. See Gifford, supra note 59, at 125-26.
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Evidence suggests that the new burdens SOX places on decision makers
distract from innovation-supporting activities like strategic
entrepreneurship and strategic monitoring. Instead, directors and top-level
management focus a greater amount of their attention on current activities
that relate to regulatory compliance.
At the executive level, one survey finds that CFOs have shifted their
attention away from strategy and increased their focus on regulatory
compliance and short-term risk management.26 In addition, a survey by
Financial Executives International found that large public companies, such
as those with greater than $700 million in revenue, spent an average of
9,700 hours on internal control compliance, not including the hours spent
by internal information technology and internal audit staff professionals.26" '
It is likely that managers responsible for formulating and executing
company strategy and other innovation-facilitating activities accounted for
a portion of those 9,700 hours, thereby allocating less time to strategy and
innovation activities. Furthermore, requiring management to sign and be
responsible for financial statement sub-certifications has likely shifted
management's time and attention to financial reporting and away from
innovation activities.
At the director level, an April 2006 survey of directors and managers
by Ernst & Young ("E&Y") found that "[n]ew regulation-in many cases
imposing detailed public disclosure with criminal penalties for directors
who sign off on false or misleading information-is focusing the attention
of the board on monitoring and managing risk as never before., 262 The
E&Y survey found that boards have allocated more resources to address
risk management issues, including establishing a "growing number of risk
committees. 263  Regulatory and compliance risk was identified as the
primary cause of increases in overall risk and as the highest priority for risk
management. 264 The survey also found that the increase in risk "has called
for more effort and attention from board members. 265 Independent board
members revealed that post-SOX their role shifted from providing strategic
advice to management to establishing and maintaining risk management
processes.266 The E&Y survey also noted the potential tension between
260. RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES supra note 250, at 1-3 ("Since the introduction of
Sarbanes-Oxley... the role of the CFO has changed from a strategic role to one that carries
much more risk and liability than in previous years. . .As the Sarbanes-Oxley dust is
settling, a new breed of CFO is emerging: a regulatory expert, with the ability to extend
knowledge into accounting, strategy and communications.").
261. FIN. EXECUTIVES INT'L, supra note 186, at 6, 14.
262. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 176, at 1 (emphasis added).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 5, 11, 18.
265. Id. at 9.
266. Id. at 10.
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directors focusing on risk mitigation and top management's responsibility
for risk-taking.267 Overall, the workload of individual directors has
substantially increased post-SOX, with audit and nominating/corporate
governance committees meeting more regularly.2 68 Annual directors' fees
have increased every year since the passage of SOX, likely reflecting the
increased workload resulting from change in the law, in addition to
increased director liability.
269
To the extent it has any impact, the increase in workload and
heightened focus on compliance, especially in the context of increased
turnover rates, likely distracts from and undermines strategic decision-
making. There are no studies directly measuring the impact on innovation
when managers and directors decrease the time they allocate to long-term
strategy and other innovation-facilitating proximate monitoring. Indirect
evidence may be found, however, in studies finding that innovation
activities increase when concentrated stockholdings increase the incentives
or ability of shareholders to engage in more proximate monitoring. These
studies are consistent with the more general proposition that innovation
decreases when there is less strategic decision making; a decrease which
may be attributable to decision makers having either less incentives,
abilities, or time to spend on innovation.
A 1991 study of 176 Fortune 500 companies by Baysinger et al. found
a positive relationship between concentrated ownership among institutional
stockholders and R&D spending, but not in conditions where concentrated
ownership was maintained by individuals. 270 This result was attributed to
institutional investors having greater incentives to take an active and long-
term strategic role in management as a result of not being able to sell large
shareholdings without a substantial loss. 2 7 1  Francis and Smith found
evidence that corporations with dispersed shareholders innovate less than
those with concentrated stock ownership among insiders, and also less than
corporations with a large block of shares owned by an outsider. 72 They
attribute this to the fact that the latter two types of ownership structures
267. Id. at 11.
268. Linck et al., supra note 165, at 15-16; see also Adam Plore, Wanted: Board
Members, PORTFOLIO.COM, July 3, 2007, at 4 (reporting directors' work hours have
increased to 206 from 100 or 150 prior to SOX); Koehn & DelVicchio, supra note 205, at 1
(reporting that one study of public companies found that, on average, audit committees met
five times annually in 2002 and seven times annually in 2003 and other studies finding a
meeting of nine times annually in 2005).
269. See THOMAS E. HARTMAN & FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN
THE ERA OF SARBANES-OXLEY 9 (2006) (charting and tabling the amount of fees that were
paid to auditors between 2001 and 2005); Linck et al., supra note 165, at 10-15 (discussing
changes in director's pay).
270. Baysinger et al. supra note 232, at 209.
271. Id. at 212-13.
272. Francis & Smith, supra note 113, at 408.
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enable monitoring of managers for innovation and reduce costs created by
myopia. 273 Using a sample of 81 firms from 1979-81, Hill and Snell found
evidence that managerial block ownership overcomes, at least to some
degree, management's inherent aversion to long-term, risky R&D
projects.2 74 More recently, Lee looked at all publicly traded U.S. firms
listed in 1995 and found that, for firms above a threshold of $100 million in
R&D investments, an increase in stock ownership concentration among
individuals and institutions was significantly correlated with an increase in
patents granted. 275 Thus, to the extent SOX distracts decision makers from
engaging in proximate monitoring or other innovation-supporting activities,
it may have the same impact as reducing the incentive or ability of
shareholders to engage in proximate monitoring, which empirical studies of
stock concentration suggest causes a reduction in innovation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that corporate governance
structures have a powerful impact on innovation by public corporations.
SOX increased the importance of financial reporting and control, increased
board independence and size, increased director and manager turnover, and
heightened companies' focus on regulatory compliance. The cumulative
impact of these changes likely undermines the ability of a substantial
portion of public companies to utilize knowledge assets, adapt to change,
engage in long-term risky projects, and otherwise undertake innovation
activities. Accordingly, SOX likely inhibits growth in the value of shares
held by investors in innovative companies that would otherwise adopt more
decentralization and place a greater emphasis on strategic control if not
subject to SOX. Consumers and the overall economy are also worse off to
the extent that SOX causes public companies to operate below their
innovative potential.
Public companies complying with SOX will undoubtedly continue to
innovate and grow, and likely even at a record pace in absolute terms.
However, the foregone benefits due to SOX reducing the innovative
potential of public companies are likely to increase, because the importance
of innovation seems to be increasing. Due to intensifying global
competition and the decreasing costs of mass communication, rapid
273. Id. at 385.
274. Charles W.L. Hill & Scott A. Snell, Effects of Ownership Structure & Control on
Corporate Productivity, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 25, 31, 42 (1989); see also Hill & Snell, supra
note 232, at 586-87 (finding a significant positive correlation between concentrated stock-
ownership by managers and R&D spending in ninety-four research-intensive Fortune 500
companies).
275. Lee, supra note 162, at 45.
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economic change is ubiquitous. 76 The U.S. economy's increasing reliance
on knowledge assets increases the potential value of innovation because
innovation is itself a product of learning and utilizing knowledge. Product
life-cycles are also becoming shorter, thereby increasing the importance of
new product development.277 In response to the increasing importance of
innovation, managers at companies worldwide consider innovation a top
strategic priority, and plan on sustaining or even increasing the high levels
of assets allocated to innovation activities.2" Accordingly, SOX likely
imposes a large, hidden, and growing cost in the form of foregone benefits
that could accrue from innovation.
The findings in this Article support a fundamental easing of the
burdens of SOX on innovative firms. The most straightforward reform in
this regard is to make voluntary for all public companies those provisions
of SOX that increase outside monitoring and the emphasis on financial
control. Other provisions of SOX, such as increased criminal liability,
likely have no tangible impact on innovation and therefore are not required
to be voluntary in order to facilitate innovation. This approach to reform is
consistent with the research findings that corporate governance structures
tend to be optimally chosen based upon firm-specific characteristics. Firms
not choosing to comply with SOX would have that choice reflected in their
financial statements, and would likely draw increased attention from
analysts and shareholder activists for managerial opportunism. Firms
electing to comply with SOX because they benefit from more outside
monitoring and financial control would also send a signal to financial
markets. By making the provisions of SOX that interfere with the
innovation process voluntary, innovative companies that benefit from
adopting more proximate monitoring than permitted under the current law
could thus operate to their full potential.
Critics of making the provisions of SOX that increase objective
monitoring and financial control voluntary would be correct to state that
such a reform may increase the potential for managerial opportunism. The
276. Kuratko & Morris, supra note 28, at 22 ("Today, the business environment is
literally defined in terms of change" such that "the pace and magnitude of change is greater
than ever before.") (emphasis in original); MORRONI, supra note 19, at 78-79 (noting that
"for many firms innovation has become ... increasingly important" because of an increase
in uncertainty in the economic environment); see also Lawson & Samson, supra note 18, at
378-380 ("The emergence of the knowledge economy, intense global competition and
considerable technological advance has seen innovation become increasingly central to
competitiveness .... Today's organisations face an additional challenge-the requirement
to innovate, not just occasionally but often, quickly and with a solid success rate.").
277. Richard A. Bettis & Michael A. Hitt, The New Competitive Landscape, 16
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 7, 8 (1995) (recognizing the implications of technological changes on
strategic management).
278. Andrew et al., supra note 31, at 7-8.
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analysis and evidence presented here, however, suggest that investors and
consumers are not better off when companies suffering from relatively
higher myopia costs are required to adopt structures designed to inhibit
opportunism. While making certain provisions of SOX voluntary may lead
to more opportunism in innovative companies, the benefits from innovation
would likely more than offset such costs and result in net benefit for
investors, consumers, and the economy.
